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Abstract
In cybercrime, phishing attacks are amongst the most popular methods to
acquire information about individuals. An attack to gather user names and
passwords can be preformed by making a fake login website, similar to a
legitimate web service, and distribute its hyperlink to unsuspecting users.
Our goal in this thesis was to design and test a solution that would reduce
the number of victims of phishing attacks.
Service authentication on the Internet mainly consists of identity
corroboration, e.g. certificates. However even if the identity is correct, it
is no guarantee that the identified service is one the user wants to access.
Cognitive entity authentication is a process where the security policy
in ordinary authentication processes is replaced with decisions preformed
by an entity with cognitive abilities, e.g. a human. It is time consuming
and difficult for a human user to do cognitive authenticate a service on
the internet, i.e. verifying that the service is the right one and not some
fraudulent site. We have designed and implemented a Petname System
which gives the user the opportunity to add personal Petnames for the
services he or she uses. These Petnames can afterwards be used by the user
to verify if the accessed service is the same as the last time. The Petname
System help will limit the rate of successful phishing attacks.
Our Petname System is an external device, which lets the user take the
Petnames with them and use the same system on different computers and
platforms. Our Petname System did not cover all the properties set for such
systems in earlier research; this was mainly because the system is external
and not a part of the web browser.
The user test of our Petname System was positive. All the subjects that
did not notice our phishing sites were stopped by our Petname System.The
subjects understood the problem of phishing, and saw the Petname System
as an extra precaution when surfing the Internet. The subjects were of the
opinion that the system should be on a device which they are already using,
e.g. a mobile phone. They would not use a separate device only for the
Petname System; it had to at least provide a number of different security
services.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Authentication is often considered as something a user does to a service. It
can also be authentication of the service itself or of the origin of a message.
In this thesis we will focus on how a user can authenticate a service, e.g. a
website.
There are multiple ways for an attacker to guide a user to a fake website,
as a method to get the user to divulge some personal information. This
type of attacks is often called phishing attacks. Users are often not aware
of this threat and will not react to subtle differences between the fake and
the genuine website. A user can use an application to help check for tell
tale signs of a phishing attack, such as a Petname System which is studied
in this thesis.
Petname Systems can be described simply as a way to allow users to
assign petnames to a spesific server system. These server systems can easily
be recognised by the petnames, there of the name.
Ferdous, Jøsang, Singh and Borgaonkar [22] propose to implement a
Petname System on a secure mobile device. As a solution to make such
systems readily available for the user at any time and any place, and not
restrict them to one specific browser installation.
1.1 Assignment
This master thesis describes the theory behind cognitive entity authentica-
tion based on Petname Systems. We will implement an external Petname
System and evaluate its usability by doing user tests and interviews.
1.2 Methodologies
Computer science is a relatively new field of research compared to other
disciplines. Nevertheless it includes elements from nearly every other field
of study. We will now highlight some of the most common methodologies
used in computer science.
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1.2.1 Theoretical
Theoretical computer science relates strongly to mathematics and logic.
In this branch of computer sciences hypothesises are formally proven or
disproved by the use of mathematical, logical and combinatorial theories.
In this category we find the constructing and analysis of algorithms.
1.2.2 Simulation
Computers have a central place in simulations of any kind. In everything
from physics and logistics to weather predictions and population growth.
The models of such simulations are based on theory with numerous
variables depending on each other. The complexity makes it practically
impossible to do by hand. One big benefit to computer simulations is
that one can introduce a fault in the model to see how it affects the result,
without the consequences this might give in a real-world scenario.
1.2.3 Development
In computer science the development of systems and prototypes is the most
important method to test and evaluate solutions. It is this that brings the
theoretical science to life. There is also a number of different models of
development. One example is the Waterfall model that is a sequential
process going through every step of the development once to the end of
the project. Another is the Iterative method, which develops a part of the
system over a limited amount of time, evaluates the results and starts a new
iteration.
1.2.4 User interaction
The human side of computer science is focused on user interaction and
experience and the scientific understanding of these. Often research into
this area is used to make a system more user-friendly, which is to develop
a more intuitive and easy system for the user. It also includes how persons
with disabilities interact with computers and software.
1.2.5 In this project
Our project is a combination of development and user tests. The first part
is to develop a mobile Petname System. Here we will use the extreme
prototyping model of software development. This model is often used in
website development and consists of three phases.
1. Make a static prototype.
2. Make the prototype fully functional, with simulated service layer.
3. Make the service layer.
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The process would probably differ in one way, some internal workings
on the service layer would be made before the functionality in the user
interface is implemented. The last phase is mainly to get it to communicate
with the web browser.
After the development is done we would continue with user tests,
interviews and the analysis of the results. It is important to get input
from user experience and if there is any increased security gained from
the Petname System.
1.3 Motivation
The problem of phishing is growing. Most of the organisations subjected to
such attacks try to stop the attacker from getting into their systems. There is
little focus on how the users can protect their own information from getting
into the hands of an attacker.
A Petname System is one way to help the user identify their known
services, by giving the user the opportunity to add a personal Petname to
the service. Some Petname Systems already exist but are not widely used.
The reasons might be that they are not widely known or the systems is too
difficult to use. Existing solutions are tied to a specific browser installation.
Which makes it hard to transfer one set of Petnames from one browser to
another on the same or other computers.
This is the particular problem for which we would like to propose a
solution. It is also important to test the users understanding of the problem
and if they would use such a system if it was available to them. It might also
give an indication of how willing users are to use new systems to ensure
the security of their personal computing environment.
1.4 Research Questions
In this thesis we will answer four questions. The first is to find which
obstacles stands in the way for cognitive entity authentication on the
Internet today. It leads nicely into the next question, how a Petname System
can aid the user in the process of cognitive server authentication.
There is no existing external Petname System available, so it has to be
designed and implemented. Lastly we need to find out if such a Petname
System would be used by users.
• What stands in the way of Cognitive entity authentication?
• How can a Petname System help with Cognitive entity authentica-
tion?
• How can an external Petname System be designed?
• Would users use an external Petname System?
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1.5 Related Work
1.5.1 Browser extensions/plugins
In [22] the authors evaluate two different extensions to a web browser,
Petname Tool and TrustBar.
None of these solutions are updated and both can be considered
defunct. Petname Tool was last updated on the 30th of June 2009 [16], while
it is hard to say when TrustBar was last updated. If [35] is anything to go
by, the last update was late january 2006.
It is unclear why they stopped developing these extensions, as there are
many factors to consider. For instance number of users, the demand and
understanding of such systems and resources available to the developer.
A careful search for other in-browser Petname System has returned
false for all the major web browsers1. There is a possibility that Petname or
similar systems are included into other browser extensions without it being
mentioned in the descriptions or anywhere else.
1.5.2 External secure devices
A number of secure devices has been described in the literature. Some
devices are designed to replace password, others can incorporate several
complete security systems. The focus on such devices by different
researches around the world shows that there is a need of an extra device
to get higher security. We will now describe some of the relevant devices.
OffPAD
The OffPAD is an Offline version of the PAD (Personal authentication
device) proposed by Jøsang and Pope [43] as a solution for user centric
identity management. In contrast to other models of identity management,
e.g. federated and centralised user identity model, different user creden-
tials are stored in the PAD which is in the user’s personal domain. The user
authenticates to the PAD and the PAD authenticates the user to the service.
The idea of the PAD has evolved into a multi purpose security device,
able to host a number of different applications. It should be offline in the
sense that it is only connected when the user wants to use it [42].
Nebuchadnezzar
Based on a concept similar to the OffPAD, Laurie and Singer describe in
their position paper [51] the Nebuchadnezzar. It is a secure device used
for authentication of users and messages. The focus of their paper is to
define the requirements for the operating system of such devices. They also
give two examples of usage scenarios: user authentication and transaction
authorisation. The latter lets the user see a requested transaction and
deciding if he or she should authorise it for further processing.
1Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox, Opera and Safari
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Pico
The Pico device proposed by Frank Stajano, is designed to replace
passwords everywhere [71]. The device requires that servers, applications
and computers support the protocol and the device communication. These
requirements alone makes it hard to get this solution into public use.
Stajano introduced a new way of authentication called Picosiblings.
The idea is that the Pico only opens in a "friendly" environment, in the
proximity of its Picosiblings. These siblings have a small transmitter and
can be put into everyday items like glasses, belt buckles, watches and so
on. He does not address the privacy issues introduced with the possibility
discover persons having picosiblings.
1.6 Report Outline
The overall structure of this document is first theory, then discussion and
lastly conclusion. The theory part consists of this chapter and Chapter 2
Background, where we describe ideas, technologies and research that is
relevant for this project. It will start with an introduction to authentication
and cognitive entity authentication. We will look on the technical aspects
of authentication and the internet.
Discussion is done in three chapters. The first of these is Chapter 3
General Discussion. Where the main topics from the previous chapter is
discussed. The design and implementation of our external Petname System
is described in Chapter 4 Technical Description. It also includes which
considerations and limitations we had to address in the development.
As a practical evaluation of the system, we have performed user tests
and interviews. The different aspects of the planning and execution of the
evaluation is described in Chapter 5 User Test. In addition the result of the
tests and interviews is presented at the end of the chapter.
We summarise our work and results in Chapter 6 Conclusion. Through-
out this work we have come across several ideas that is either a continu-
ation of this work or is relevant for future development. All these are put
together in Chapter 7 Future work.
1.7 The Lucidman Project
Our thesis is a part of the Lucidman (Local User Centric ID Management)
project [53]. The project is done in cooperation between Norwegian and
French companies and higher education institutions.
In addition to the University of Oslo the following companies and
higher education institutions was a part of this project: GREYC, TazTag,
CEV, Tellu, and Vallvi
The aim for this project is to focus on the identity management on the
client side in a simple and usable method. There is a big challenge in how
to ensure good security and usability for the user, as these aspects often are
considered contradictory.
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The project started in the spring of 2011 with a time span of two
years. During this time there was monthly telephone meetings and semi-
annual face-to-face meetings, alternating between Oslo and Normandy.
The project had a budget of 530.000 € and resulted in a number of papers,
two patent applications, two open workshops and multiple master theses.
1.7.1 GREYC
GREYC is a research lab that is a part of ENSICAEN, which is one of
the national universities of engineering in France. Degrees awarded from
institutions like ENSICAEN are internationally regarded as equal to a
Master’s in science.
It is the E-Payment and Biometrics Research Unit at GREYC that
participate in the LUCIDMAN project. The unit is directed by Professor
Christophe Rosenberger and mainly works within computer security.
They have a focus on biometrics and trust. In the LUCIDMAN project
they contributed with biometric use cases and development of biometric
applications.
1.7.2 TazTag
TazTag is a company that produces secure electronic devices. Some of the
devices have biometric capabilities. They are developing pads and phones
with higher security by introducing secure hardware elements available
for the developers of applications. They contributed in this project with
devices, like the TazCard and TazPad.
1.7.3 CEV
CEV makes card solutions for discrete payment applications. includes
prepaid vouchers, travel tickets and loyalty cards. Their most known
product is the shopping card Cartaplus, which is widely spread around
the world. CEV is a part of Chèque Déjeuner Group in France, which is
the biggest provider of prepaid meal vouchers in France. In this project
they contributed with business loyalty and e-shopping use cases, as well as
being the French project manager.
1.7.4 Vallvi AS
Vallvi is a Norwegian company doing consultant project management and
business development within the field of information and communication
technology. Vallvi provides the Norwegian project manager of the
LUCIDMAN project.
1.7.5 Tellu AS
Tellu is a small Norwegian IT company that both develops their own
products and provide consulting services. They specialise in mobile
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applications and tracking, which is used in their SmartTracker product. It
is used by physical security companies to tell if they have checked physical
access points (e.g. doors and gates). In LUCIDMAN they focused on use
cases and development.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we will go through ideas, research, articles and other
relevant material for our thesis. As authentication is an important part
of this thesis as well as every day life, we will start with theory about
authentication and how server authentication is done today.
Before we go into the topic of phishing in Section 2.4 on page 25, we
will take a short look on the development of the World Wide Web, as it is
highly relevant.
One of the techniques that can help against the threat of phishing
attacks is Petname Systems. In Section 2.5 on page 29 we will describe
the model these systems builds upon and different work done on Petname
Systems. We will also go into different secure devices that can be used by
such a system in Section 2.6 on page 34.
2.1 Authentication
When discussing authentication, the topic is often how to authenticate a
client to a service or other resources of some kind. For instance the act
of providing user credentials for on-line authentication is now becoming
second nature for any internet user. The field of authentication is more
than just user authentication, in Figure 2.1 on the next page we can see the
taxonomy of authentication.
In the X.800 standard [14] there are two types of authentication services,
Peer-entity authentication and Data origin authentication.
Data origin authentication
The corroboration that the source of data received is as claimed.
Peer-entity authentication
The corroboration that a peer entity in an association is the one claimed.
The data origin authentication service provides the corroboration for the
source of the data. It must not be confused with data integrity as the
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Figure 2.1: Taxonomy of authentication
data can be modified as well as duplicated while the source identity is
corroborated.
Peer-entity authentication is a service that provides identity confirmation
of communicating entities. It can only be provided under the establishment
of a connection and while transferring data. Depending on the authentica-
tion scheme this can be just one way or a mutual peer entity authentication.
X.800 is related to the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) Basic
reference model [13]. The authentication provides corroboration of the
identity to the layer above the layer where the service itself is provided.
For instance a service on the network layer (layer number 3), can provide
corroboration of the identity to the transport layer (number 4). It should be
noted that this is an overarching description of how such a system should
work, not a guide for implementation.
The X.800 standard is describing what we call syntactic authentication,
where it only check if the peer entity or the data origin are what they say
that they should be. It does not concern itself with the nature of the entity
nor the security policy. So an entity can authenticate itself as the Mafia and
it would not be anything different from any other authenticated entity.
When peer entities are discussed, it is the server and the client that are
under consideration. Often forgetting that normally servers and clients
are only tools for organisations and users. Changing the peer entities to
be a user and an organisation adds several layers of complexity to the
discussion.
Figure 2.2 on the facing page shows different types of entity authen-
tication with the four entities Service Provider Organisation, Server system,
Client system and Human User. They can authenticate each other between
the User Side and Server Side. The different types of entity authentication is
described below.
2.1.1 User authentication
There are a number of ways for a server to authenticate a user. The simplest
way is to use a user name and password. This has been the way to do user
authentication from the early years of the Internet. Still web forums and
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Figure 2.2: General entity authentication types [78].
User side authentication
U → O: The User is authenticated by the Organisation.
U → S: The User is authenticated by the Server.
C → O: The Client is authenticated by the Organisation.
C → S: The Client is authenticated by the Server.
Server side authentication
O→ U: The Organisation is authenticated by the User.
O→ C: The Organisation is authenticated by the Client.
S→ U: The Server is authenticated by the User.
S→ C: The Server is authenticated by the Client.
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other none sensitive solutions often use only user name and password.
Services with more sensitive information often use user names and
passwords in combination with other factors of authentication. The reason
why this is done is to give a higher level of confidence in the authentication
process. Two-factor authentication is when an authentication method
requires two types of credentials. These credentials can be placed into
different categories.
Something you know
Passwords, PIN, etc.
Something you are
Fingerprints, voice, key-stroke dynamics and other biometrics.
Something you have
Code lists, One-time pads, smart cards, applications on smart phones,
other physical and virtual devices.
2.1.2 Cognitive entity authentication
In [41] we coined the term Cognitive entity authentication. It is used to
describe authentication done by human users and organisations. A human
is considered to be a cognitive entity because of its non-deterministic free
will. An organisation is also regarded as a cognitive entity because it is
governed by one or more humans. Clients and servers is considered as
system entities, as they only do what they are programmed to do.
Since we did not give the term Cognitive entity authentication a clear
definition in [41], we will define it now.
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) defines
identification as the process whereby a network element recognises a valid
user’s identity. Authentication is defined as the process of verifying the
claimed identity of a user [64]. We will call this type of authentication
Syntactic entity authentication.
Syntactic entity authentication
The verification by the relying party that the identity of the entity in a
communication session is as claimed.
When a system combines Syntactic entity authentication and verification
of required characteristics of the entity, we get Semantic entity authentication.
For instance verifying that the identity is on a white list or has the required
reputation level.
Semantic entity authentication
The verification by the relying entity (A) that the identity of the entity (B) in a
communication session is as claimed, and in addition the verification by entity
A that entity B has semantic characteristics that are compatible with a formal
security policy.
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In Cognitive entity authentication the formal security policy from
the Semantic entity authentication is replaced with cognitive reasoning
capability. The cognitive entity authentication is normally performed by
humans1, who apply their cognitive reasoning capability to examine the
entity and make a decision.
Cognitive entity authentication
The verification by the cognitive relying party (A) that the identity of the entity
(B) in a communication session is as claimed, and in addition the examination
by entity A of the true nature of entity B in order to decide if it is acceptable to
connect to the authenticated entity.
System entities can easily authenticate each other with methods and
technologies such as cryptographic certificates. It can be used on both sides
to ensure mutual system entity authentication. The client can save a hash
of the server’s certificate, which can be used to verify that the certificate is
the same as last time.
A problem arises when a cognitive entity should authenticate a system
entity, usually a human user authenticating the server. This is not trivial to
do at the moment, as there are plenty of ways to fool either the client or the
user. To fool the system entity client, an attacker needs to introduce some
malicious information in an insecure part of the client or the systems the
client relies upon.
To fool a human is easier. Our brain has the capability to add missing
information and change perceived information. Such effects are illustrated
by the large number of optical illusions, where the brain perceives the
reality differently then it actually is.
Aoccdrnig to a rscheearch at Cmabrigde Uinervtisy, it deosn’t
mttaer in waht oredr the ltteers in a wrod are, the olny iprmoetnt tihng
is taht the frist and lsat ltteer be at the rghit pclae. The rset can be a
toatl mses and you can sitll raed it wouthit porbelm. Tihs is bcuseae
the huamn mnid deos not raed ervey lteter by istlef, but the wrod as a
wlohe.
Some years ago the text in the previous paragraph circulated on the
internet. It is a practical example that shows that the brain sees what it
expects to see. Matt Davis, a researcher at the Cognition and Brain Sciences
Unit in Cambridge UK, has written a web page about this effect [18]. He
points out that the text is probably manipulated to be easy to read and gives
a list over techniques to accomplish this.
A widely used technique is to change a character with another that
is similar to the first. The classic example is "Paypal" and "Paypa1". The
success of such replacements is largely depending on the font used.
1It is also possible to construct artificial intelligence to do this in specific cases.
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By using character replacement and order changes an attacker could
be able to register a domain name. The attacker can guide unsuspecting
users to the website using this domain name. This calls for a user friendly
way to easily check the identity of a service, a way to do a cognitive server
authentication.
2.2 Authentication of Servers
There is currently no easy way for a user to authenticate the servers he or
she accesses. In a web browser it is possible to double check domain name,
SSL certificate or other properties. However it is difficult, time consuming
and can be forged. We should not dismiss the mental load the users would
be experiencing if they had to check and remember key information for
every service they interact with. It is important that the authentication
process gives the user as little mental load as possible. If this load is
too high people would not perform authentication, as humans normally
choose the path of least resistance.
In the Indian framework for e-Authentication, called e-Pramaan [21],
they have a section about website authentication. They suggest the
following techniques to prevent phishing:
• User education and awareness
• Web site design to avoid phishing:
– Watermark/Customised logo
– Last login details, last transaction details, etc.
• Digital certificates for Web sites
• Programming solutions to prevent superimposition by face Web sites.
The framework is shorter than its draft [32], which gives better
descriptions for the different techniques mentioned above. We will go more
into what this draft describes in relation to Cognitive entity authentication
in Section 2.2.4 on page 21.
2.2.1 The domain name system
In the beginning when the internet was small, the users could remember
the IP-addresses for their services. This is no longer the case. To find
our way around the internet we have to use the Domain Name System
(DNS). The domain names in this system are just pointers to IP-addresses
and work like a public distributed hierarchical one-way phone book.
Lookup of the IP-address to the related domain name, might be harder.
It requires that a reverse DNS pointer is added. Such a pointer has to
be added by an internet service provider that owns the IP-address. For
instance such a pointer is added for the IP-address 129.240.8.200. In the
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Figure 2.3: The hierarchical domain name system
DNS the domain name "200.8.240.129.in-addr.arpa"2 returns a pointer to
www.uio.no.
It is not mandatory to have a reverse pointer. Because one web server
can host thousands of domain names the pointer is often impractical to
maintain. However there are services on the Internet that provide such
information even if the reverse record does not exist. The information is
gathered in databases by saving which IP-address a domain name points
to.
The hierarchy
The root domain is controlled by Internet Assigned Numbers Authority
(IANA)3. They are the top of the hierarchy and have distributed the
control of each top level domain name to countries, territories and private
2The IP-address is written in reverse in the domain name to be able to delegate ranges
of IP-addresses to different name servers.
3http://www.iana.org/
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agencies. For instance .com to the company Verisign4, .no to Norway where
UNINETT Norid AS5 is the appointed registry by the government and
.as to American Samoa handled by AS Domain Registry6. Some top level
domains have a second level of domain names, with special use like .co.uk
intended for commercial enterprises [61] and .priv.no is only for private
individuals registered in the Norwegian National Register [6]. A part of
the DNS structure is shown in Figure 2.3 on the preceding page.
There are also companies that sell sub domains without being connec-
ted to the official registries, e.g. .co.no where a company have bought the
rights to the co.no domain name. They have made it possible for anyone to
register sub domains for this domain name [12], giving foreign companies
the opportunity to register a "Norwegian" domain name.
It is easy to register a domain name and they can be quite similar to
already existing domain names. Different companies often have the same
name in different domains, e.g. telenor.no and telenor.se. Such naming
schemes make users more accustomed to see other domain names for the
same service or services from the same entity.
DNS poisoning
It is possible to corrupt a domain name server cache, making subsequent
queries to the DNS return wrong data. A corruption like this would make
the client connect to a bogus and in most cases malicious server. To explain
how this happens we first need to know how a DNS server works.
When a DNS-resolver queries a Name Server for a DNS-record, it sends
a UDP-packet with a unique 16-bit identifier. The server response includes
this identifier to match up the reply to one request. The identifier is
included since several requests can be running at the same time and the
system needs a way to distinguish one request from the other. The result of
the query is cached for some time to not overload the Name Server [59].
It is the 16-bit identifier that is used by attackers to insert false
records into the DNS cache. An attacker can send numerous malicious
UDP-packets which looks like a DNS-response packet, all with different
identifiers. One of these might have the same identifier as an open query
on the DNS-resolver. If it happens the DNS server will cache the response
and return it to every system using it as a resolver.
DNSSEC
The solution for most of the security problems in DNS, such as poisoning,
is Domain Name System SECurity Extensions (DNSSEC). The DNSSEC
system cryptographically ensures the integrity of the response and makes
it nearly impossible to forge a response. If the validation of the integrity
fails, the DNS servers return the same error as if the record did not exist.
Faults in DNSSEC cannot be temporary accepted by the user as it can with
4http://www.verisigninc.com/
5http://www.norid.no/
6http://www.nic.as/
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certificate faults in Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer
(HTTPS). We will give a short introduction to how DNSSEC works. The
different elements used is described in Table 2.1.
RR Resource Record
RR is an entry in the DNS-system. Depending on the type, it
points to resources or data.
RRSIG Resource Record Signature
RRSIG is a special resource record containing the signature
for one ordinary RR. It is returned at the same time as the RR
is validates.
DNSKEY Domain Name System Key
DNSKEY is the resource record where the public part of keys
is saved, e.g. ZSK and KSK. It also has an accompanying
RRSIG.
ZSK Zone Signing Key
ZSK is the key used to sign the resource records. It has a
Private and Public part.
KSK Key Signing Key
KSK is used to sign the ZSK. It has a Private and Public part.
DS Delegation Signer
DS is a record stored in the parent Zone with a HASH of the
public part of the KSK.
Table 2.1: Short descriptions of elements used in DNSSEC.
Every RR in the zone is signed with a private key. The validation
process of DNSSEC is quite simple and described in [4, 5]. Each RR in
DNS has a RRSIG, which contains the signature for the current RR. The
signature can be authenticated with the ZSK, which is a public key stored
in a DNSKEY record. The DNSKEY record containing the ZSK is signed
with the KSK, available in another DNSKEY record. The record containing
the KSK is self signed. To verify this key, a digest of the KSK is stored in a
DS record in the parent DNS zone, which in turn has its own RRSIG. The
process iterates all the way up to the root. In Figure 2.4 on the following
page it is shown which record validates the next. The loop on the right side
of the DNSKEY indicates that it is self signed.
The difference between the KSK and the ZSK is that the ZSK is used
often, for every DNS RR and every change in the DNS zone. While the
KSK only signs the ZSK. It is also reflected in how long these keys are
active. The ZSK might be changed once every 2 to 3 months, while the
KSK once every year. It would have been possible to just have one key in
the DNSSEC-standard. There is several motivations for having two keys:
To minimise the number of times an administrator needs to update the key
in the parent DNS-server. The KSK can be stronger without impacting the
performance (as it only signs a small amount of data). The KSK can have a
longer lifetime and can be saved in a more secure place then ZSK [49].
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Figure 2.4: DNSSEC signing/validation chain for example.com
In such a system, it is important that the key verifying the root7 (the
DNSKEY with a double line in Figure 2.4) is correct. Root KSK is the
public key and trust anchor for the root. It is where the system goes from
mathematically provable to depend on trust. A normal user will not have
any knowledge about this key and will trust their web browser and local
domain name server to have the right key. If a person wants to check the
validity of the root KSK, he or she can validate it with the public key of
a trusted person that have signed the root KSK. Numerous people have
signed the root KSK and can personal attest to its authenticity. Many
of them was present when the root key-pair was generated (including
personnel from IANA [75]).
It has taken some time for DNSSEC to be implemented and supported
in different systems. The DNSSEC Root Key Signing Key was not
generated before June 2010.
Some registries have worked to get up the number of domain names
with DNSSEC activated. One of these is .SE (top level register for .se
domain names [26]). They held a campaign in December 2011 offering
cheaper domain names if DNSSEC was enabled, for both new registrations
and renewals. Over the year 2011 .SE went from 4 299 domain names with
DNSSEC to 171 650 [27]. The Norwegian .no domain will not be signed
before the end of 2013. DNSSEC will probably not be available for the
holders of .no domains before in 2014.
2.2.2 Secure sockets layer certificate
Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) uses X.509 certificates and are organised in a
X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure (PKIX). These are hierarchical structured,
however in a slightly different way than the domain name system. The
7DNSSEC Root Key Signing Key
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certificates are signed by a parent certificate all the way up to the root
certificate which is self-signed [17]. For a certificate to be valid, the root
certificate has to be pre-installed and a part of the systems PKIX. It is a
requirement for the system to be able to validate the chain of trust.
The difference between the domain name system and SSL certificates
is that instead of having one clear root, the SSL certificates have multiple
roots. It is the software distributor who decides which root certificates
would be included in the software. A root certificate are administrated
by one Certificate Authority (CA). They negotiate with the software
distributor to get their root certificates included and to be a part of the
software PKIX.
PKIX supports Certificate Revocation Lists (CRL). These are maintained
by the CA and includes all certificates that have been revoked. Most of
the certificates in this list is revoked because of administrative reasons, e.g.
change in the certificate data. The interesting certificates is those who is on
the CRL because of exposure of its private key. As this gives an attacker the
opportunity to use the information to set up fake sites.
The functionality that checks these lists is normally deactivated in web
browsers and will removed from Google Chrome in the future [30]. The
critique against CRL is that it is an old and slow system. It might slow
down the process of opening a web page with a second. The CRL also
needs to be checked regularly by the browser, so new entries in the list can
be recognised.
Security issues
Soghoian and Stamm [70] point out that many government agencies can
compel a CA to help in surveillance, by giving the agency a website specific
certificate that can be used to spoof a website. The government agency
might even get an intermediate CA certificate. This certificate can be used
by the agency to make certificates for every site or service they want to,
without the CAs knowledge.
A CAs private key can be compromised and used to sign certificates
for servers with malicious intent. Recently a CA named DigiNotar was
hacked. The attackers used the information to generate a number of
certificates. Among the certificates generated was one for the domain
name *.google.com [24]. The certificate gave the attackers the opportunity
to impersonate different services from Google in browsers who trusted
DigiNotar’s root certificate.
The identification check of companies done by the CAs may also be
inadequate. Someone might get a certificate for a service without having
any affiliation to the service. One example of this happened when VeriSign
Inc. issued a certificate for "Microsoft Corporation" [55]. The certificate was
given to an individual who claimed to be a Microsoft employee.
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Firewalls
There is also a rise in the use of firewalls that can inspect application
data transferred over SSL. Such solutions has been developed as a
countermeasure to use of secure communication for nefarious purposes.
It is called a Trusted man-in-the-middle [36]. To achieve this the firewall
has its own CA. Its public certificate is installed on the devices behind the
firewall. When a user opens a web page over SSL, the firewall checks the
real certificate of the service and sets up a connection to the service. It then
generates a new internal certificate for the connection between the firewall
and the client. This certificate is validated since the root certificate of the
firewall is present.
Figure 2.5 shows how a normal firewall lets a SSL-tunnel through, while
Figure 2.6 on the next page shows how a firewall with HTTPS inspection
is an end-point for both the SSL-connections and inspect the content going
through the SSL-tunnel. The only way for a user to detect this is to check if
the issuer of the certificate is the firewalls CA.
Firewalls that do HTTPS inspection also introduces a single point of
failure. If one of the certificates in the firewall is compromised, every
device inside the network is at risk without any way to ensure their SSL-
connections. Or if an attacker gets access to the firewall, he will be able to
see all data sent through it.
2.2.3 DANE
One solution for the problems with SSL certificates is to use DNSSEC and
put the certificate in the DNS structure. The DNS-based Authentication
of Named Entities (DANE) introduces a new resource record called TLSA
[37]. This record can contain different types of certificate data, a complete
certificate or just a hash of it. It can also have three different kinds of
certificates:
1. There is a requirement that one special certificate must be a parent of
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the certificate provided by the TLS-handshake. The certificate must
also be validated in the services PKIX.
2. The certificate in DNSSEC must be exactly the same as provided by
the TLS-handshake. The PKIX must also be validated.
3. The certificate must be exactly the same as provided by the TLS-
handshake. This certificate will not be validated against PKIX.
If everyone uses the last alternative it can make CAs obsolete and
transfer more power to the administrators of domain name servers. A big
advantage will be that the chain of trust will follow the strict hierarchical
structure of the DNS, back to the DNS root.
2.2.4 Personalisation
The ability for a user to personalise the content he or she sees when they
log on to a website is one way to do cognitive entity authentication. The only
problem is that most of the solutions available are vulnerable to man-in-
the-middle attacks. Such an attack can be done by getting the user to log
on to a fake service that works like a proxy to the real service. In this way
the attacker can serve the user his or hers personalised information.
Multiple ways has been proposed and implemented to try to authen-
ticate servers. All of them are based on ’Trust-on-first-use’. As the name
says, the user has to trust the service on the first use [79]. There is no way
to be one hundred percent sure that the service the user is registering to is
actually the service he or she wants.
One scenario would be when the user clicks on a hyper link on a page
and gets to a social media site. If the user is not familiar with this site, he
can be mislead to believe a fraudulent site is the real one and give away
personal information.
Several websites let the user choose a security picture8. Such a picture
will be shown after the user enters his or hers user name and before
8Also known as watermarks.
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Figure 2.7: An example if a Yahoo login sign-in seal.
entering their password. This solution has also been implemented using
text, where the user adds a phrase or sentence for the service to show
back to the user when they log on. It can be extended to also include text
formatting like color, size and type.
The draft for the Indian National e-Authentication Framework [32]
discusses use of such images as a cost efficient alternative to authentication
methods that require smart cards or hardware tokens. In their example of
a site-to-user authentication system, the authentication process consist of
three steps.
1. The user send his or hers user name to the service.
2. The service shows the picture.
3. If it is the correct the user enters his or hers password.
They claim that this has been used for number of years now, by services
such as banks etc.
The problem with this solution is that it is vulnerable to a man-in-the-
middle attack. Where the user sends his user name to the attacker and
the attacker in turn sends this to the service. From the service point of
view the attacker is the user and therefore show the security picture. The
attacker extracts this picture and shows is to the user. The user would see
the picture and recognise it as their own, not suspecting that anything is
wrong and enter his or hers password.
Yahoo has used a similar system where a user can select a picture,
symbol or words together with a colour scheme. They call this Sign-In Seals
[39]. In Figure 2.7 one example is shown where the three words, "Three
Secret Words", and colour blue is set by the user. Instead of showing this
custom graphics between user name and password, it is shown when the
user opens the login page. The graphic in the Sign-In Seal is the same for
every user on the same web browser. The page saves a Cookie9 that is only
9A small piece of data saved in the user’s browser.
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available for pages on that domain name. The data saved in the cookie
would not be sent to a different domain, e.g. a phishing site.
The US National Institute of Standards and Technology’s SP800-63-1
[11], has some of the same techniques as already described. However
they also describes when the personalisation is presented after the login
is completed.
The SP800-63-1 publication also discusses email verification, they
introduce a method called "Personalization of email sent to the Subscriber by a
valid Verifier". It works by letting the user select an image when registering
to a service. The image is included into every email the user gets from
the service provider, giving the user the opportunity to verify the sender.
A solution like this would require an attacker to stage a difficult attack,
requiring access to either the user mail account, the user information on
the service or the communication between these.
Some systems show the user the time and date for the last successful
login. It may also include the hostname from where the login originated.
The information is often shown to the user after a successful login. The idea
is to alert the user about unauthorized usage, or in the case it is missing, the
site might be fraudulent. This method is used by the Norwegian E-identity
(MinID) and the Norwegian On-line banking identification (BankID).
A big drawback with all such systems was pointed out Schechter et
al. [68]. They tested how many would still log on to a service even if
the expected picture was replaced with a maintanance notice. The result
was surprising as 58 out of 60 still entered their credentials. Another
test focused on how many would react to a missing SSL indicator. All
63 participants continued to enter their user name and password, which
shows how few actually notices such indicators.
2.3 Development of World Wide Web
The Internet has over the years evolved from a set of simple networks
used by researchers to communicate with each other, to a complex network
delivering services and applications to everybody. The first web browser
was just a document reader, now they are capable of run applications that
earlier had to be installed on the computer. All these new functionalities
and technologies also introduces security challenges.
2.3.1 Dynamic web pages
The big revolution on the web was scripting. The possibility to do
complex changes on a web page depending on user input and environment
has changed the way developers work. With the development of
Asynchronous JavaScript and XML (AJAX) the need to reload a page to get
updated information disappeared. Data can be moved freely between the
web browser and the web server. It is easier to develop for web, because the
solutions do not have to take the operating system nor the type of computer
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into account. The deployment of web based systems has also become much
simpler, as a user only needs to enter a website address to get access.
2.3.2 Website attacks
Over the years a wide range of different attacks against websites have been
invented. Probably one of the most common is "Denial of service"-attacks
(DoS). These attacks can also be distributed, giving another "D" in the
abbreviation. DDoS is hard to combat as they come from multiple sources
and can at first glance look like normal traffic. When the generated traffic
becomes too high, servers get overloaded and cannot handle the requests
from normal users. Which results in the website becoming unavailable.
Cross-Side-Scripting (XSS) is an attack which works by inserting mali-
cious code into a legitimate website through the interactions of the user.
Often done by giving a user a link which points to a service. The link in-
cludes malicious scripts that are designed to be run on the web page of
the service. XSS can have a wide range of purposes, such as transfer of or
access to funds, resources or privileges. It is also possible to change the
workings of the site, for instance make the page send the user name and
password to two servers instead of one.
From our point of view there is one type of attacks that is especially
interesting for this project, namely Website cracking10. The reason for this
is that attackers often attack legitimate websites to hide their phishing site.
Website cracking is a generic term for all types of attacks that modifies web
pages, complete or just a small part. It has some subcategories, where the
last in the list below is our main point of focus.
Defacing
An attacker just changes the content of a website because he can.
Information acquiring
Downloading the content, or adding scripts that send information to
the attacker.
Virus spreading
Adding some code that loads hidden pictures, JavaScript, Flash
animations or PDF-documents that uses security vulnerabilities to
spread malicious code.
Phishing
Uploading a fake copy of a legitimate service to an already existing
website. We discuss this further in Section 2.4 on the next page.
2.3.3 Content Delivery Networks
As more information gets on to the internet, it requires servers that can
deliver all the required information to the end user. To be able to do this
10Also known as hacking. The informatics community defines often cracking as the
malicious form of hacking [28, 29]
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each service provider requires a wast amount of servers and bandwidth,
which has given rise to Content Delivery Networks (CDN). They place
servers on locations all over world, even inside the networks of Internet
Service Providers (ISP). This gives the users access to the information fast
as the data is available locally. Solutions like this is also lowering the load
on the network.
CDNs rent out capacity and storage space to web services, e.g. YouTube
and Facebook. Instead of Facebook negotiating with every ISP to be able to
place a server in their network, Facebook negotiate with a CDN to put the
information in their servers.
Use of such services can be seen in the source code from different
service providers. For instance Facebook.com downloads files from a
server called fbstatic-a.akamaihd.net. The domain akamaihd.net is registered
to Akamai Technologies, which is a large CDN [76].
2.4 Phishing Attacks
The word Phishing was first used in january of 1996, however the attack
existed before this [15]. In 1990 Harriman wrote a paper on a related topic
using the term Fishing [33].
Phishing attacks exploit the weak cognitive server identification. It is a
way to get a user to give some information about himself to a fake service,
while believing this is a legitimate service. The information has mostly
been log-in credentials and credit card information, but have evolved into
automatic ways to get complete identities for identity thefts.
It is important for the attacker to be careful not to give the user any
misgivings. If the user gets suspicious after the attack he or she might
change all their passwords and notify credit card issuer or other authorities.
Phishing has always been about profit in some way or another. An
attacker can use credentials to get access to resources and information,
which again can be sold or used in a way to benefit the attackers cause. In
recent years, the selling of identities or user credentials on the black market
has become more common.
2.4.1 Types and techniques
There are several types of phishing attacks. The simplest is sending an
email and ask for some information. The most used is phishing websites,
where a false website gives the impression of being legitimate.
Advanced phishing attacks tries to install some kind of malware on the
user’s computer. The malware is used by attackers to get information from
the computer, e.g. keystrokes and file contents. Malware is outside the
scope of this thesis.
Phishing email
Email is the most used form of communication between people on the
Internet. Sadly most of the emails sent are characterised as SPAM. A
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SPAM-mail can be described as one email sent to many receivers, which the
receivers do not want. One of the reasons for its popularity is how simple
it is to send an email. Most automatically recognised phishing emails is
stopped in SPAM-filters.
In listing 2.1 we show an example of a phishing mail. Here we can see
the attacker’s use of email addresses to try fool the receiver. They are also
writing that the receiver’s email can be deleted and the account unavailable
if he or she does not answer. The text is made to intimidate the user and get
them to provide the requested information. The first problem for this attack
to succeed is that the email was sent to a company email to a Norwegian
ISP. Which goes to show that this is sent to all e-mail addresses the attacker
can get their hands on.
Listing 2.1: Classic example of a phising mail
Reply−To : <updatevices@yahoo . co . jp >
From : " IT S e r v i c e s "< I T s e r v i c e s @ a c t i v i s t . com>
S u b j e c t : New Update
Date : Wed, 30 Jan 2013 1 0 : 2 3 : 1 5 −0800
Dear Email User
This message i s from Information Technology S e r v i c e s of This EMAIL
to a l l our S t a f f . We are c u r r e n t l y upgrading our database and
e−mail c e n t e r and t h i s i s our f i n a l n o t i f i c a t i o n to you . we have
sent s e v e r a l messages to you without response .
We are d e l e t i n g a l l unused Mail account to c r e a t e space f o r new
accounts . In order not to be suspended , you w i l l have to update
your account by providing the information l i s t e d below :
updatevices@yahoo . co . jp
Confirm Your E−Mail D e t a i l s . .
Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
User name : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Password : . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Re Confirm Password : . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I f you f a i l to confirm your continuous usage of our s e r v i c e s by
confirming your email password now, your account w i l l be d i s a b l e
and you w i l l not be able to a c c e s s your email .
You should immediately reply t h i s email : updatevices@yahoo . co . jp
and enter your password in the above password column .
Thanks f o r your understanding .
Regard ,
IT S e r v i c e s
Email as a direct mean to get information like user names and
passwords has lost some ground over the years. The reason for this
is mostly because people are more cautious about sending sensitive
information by email [46]. The scepticism against email can be related to
the big number of SPAM emails users on the internet receives every day
and the publicity on the topic.
Today, phishing websites are more likely to succeed as users are more
accustomed to enter personal information on a web page. Links to a
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phishing website can be distributed in emails, posts on social websites,
advertisement banners and instant messaging among others [63].
Phishing sites
In [19] Dhamija et al. found that a good phishing site was able to fool
90 % of their participants just by using different widely available phishing
techniques. These are described in the list below.
Visually deceptive text
This is character replacement as already discussed in Section 2.1.2 on
page 12.
Images masking underlying text
Attackers can use an image of a legitimate hyper link, which in fact
points to another fake site.
Images mimicking windows
This technique is an image that looks like a real window, but in fact
it is a hyper link. The image can look like an error message window,
making the user click on the image out of habit.
Windows masking underlying windows
An attacker can get the browser to spawn new windows. These can
be moved to a specific place and show the attackers content.
Deceptive look and feel
The site is cleverly made and there is only small elements as
misspelling or tone of language that give it away. It can also be asking
about more information then the site would normally do.
In their set of 22 participants they did not find any correlation between
the subjects test scores and their sex, age, education level, the weekly
number of hours used on a computer or how acquainted they were with
the browser or operating system.
Phishing in the URI
Klevjer [47] described a way to save a complete web page in a link. It was
done by using data Uniform Resource Identifier (URI) scheme, where one
can set the content type of the media, what kind of encoding has been
used and the data itself. He also pointed out that it was possible to save
such URIs in Uniform Resource Locator (URL) shortening services e.g.
TinyURL.com. Below is one simple example from the paper put in a html
link tag.
<a href="data:text/plain;base64,aGVsbG8=">link</a>
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Figure 2.8: Unique phishing reports received by APWG
2.4.2 Statistics
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) has over the last years
collected reports of phishing attempts through emails and websites [1].
The number of unique attempts has been published in their Phishing Attack
Trends Reports. These numbers have been put together in Figure 2.8. It
shows that the number of unique reports varies for phishing websites.
Some of the spikes in Figure 2.8 comes of changes done by the APWG
in their methodology. In August 2006 APWG changed the method of
counting unique URLs to differentiate between phishing sites on different
sub-domains as well as different paths. The change is the reason for the big
jump in recorded phishing websites in that same month. The next big spike
in April 2007, was caused by multiple phishing sites on the same domain.
The next two periods with high number of phishing sites, the second part of
2009 and first part of 2012, is due to higher phishing activity and not to any
changes in the method by APWG. It is clear that the number of phishing
websites is rising.
The number of phishing emails might be slightly dropping, however it
is hard to determine with such short a time span. It is important to note that
these numbers are based on reported cases, which means the real number
of attempts might be higher.
In APWGs Phishing Activity Trends Report from second half of 2011, Carl
Leonard from Websense Security Labs states:
"Even fewer phishing web sites are using the oh-so-obvious IP host to host
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their fake login pages, instead preferring to host on a compromised domain. There
has been a 16 percent drop in the number of phishing URLs containing the spoofed
company name in the URL. These combined trends show how phishers are adapting
to users becoming more informed and knowledgeable about the traits of a typical
phish." [2]
2.4.3 Spear phishing
The term spear phishing is used when an attacker has a particular target.
Normal phishing attacks try to get credentials from anyone, while spear
phishing points out one person or a small group of people. This gives
the attacker the opportunity to make the attack so specific that is hard
for automatic systems to detect it. One recent example of such an
attack was targeted towards some of the executives in the Norwegian
telecommunication company Telenor [40]. The attacker got access to their
personal computers which includes their Email, files and passwords.
2.5 Petname Model
The Petname Model is a systematic way to personalise global identities.
Systems implementing this model allows users to relate identities with
some kind of personal media. For instance names, text strings, images or
even sounds.
2.5.1 Zooko’s triangle
Zooko presented in [82] three desirable properties that a name should
have, but cannot have at the same time. Those three properties is
known as Zooko’s triangle. These properties are Decentralized, Secure and
Human-Meaningful. As proposed by Stiegler in [72] we will use "Global"
instead of "Decentralized", as "Global" is a more understandable concept.
"Memorable" instead of "Human-Meaningful" and "Unique" instead of
"Secure". The last renaming might not be as clear as the other two, the
reason for the change is that the security of a name lies in its uniqueness.
Zooko’s triangle is shown as it is commonly depicted in Figure 2.9 on
the following page. A triangle with Global, Unique and Memorable as its
corners.
The Domain Name System is probably the closest naming system to
incorporate all three properties, however since it is possible for a third-
party to register domain names with small changes it is vulnerable to
mimicking and thereby phishing. Stiegler points out "In general, phishing
depends on mimicry, not forgery" [72].
The properties of names in Zooko’s triangle are:
Global
The name is public and global. It can be exemplified with names of
companies, persons or every day objects.
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Figure 2.9: Zonko’s triangle with elements from a Petname System
Unique
A name is unique syntactically within its domain. For instance phone
numbers.
Memorable
A name is easy to remember and recognise. One example often used
is the "moving bus test". You see a bus with some name or address on
the side and you still remember it when you get home.
When the Petname Model is added into Zooko’s triangle, we get
different types of names as connections between each property: Pointers,
Nicknames and Petnames. These are the connections between the corners
in Figure 2.9. The different name types that connects the corners in Zooko’s
triangle are as follows:
Pointers
They are Global and Unique, but not Memorable. It has also been
called "True Name" by Shapiro [69] and "Key" by Miller [58] and
Stiegler [72]. The pointer is a unique identifier for one specific
person, document, system etc. Social security number combined
with nationality is one example of a unique identifier for persons in
Norway.
Nicknames
A Nickname is Global and Memorable, but since a nickname can mean
different things to different people, it is not Unique in the global
domain. A person’s given name is such a nickname.
Petnames
Both Memorable and Unique, but not Global as this is personal and
30
might also be context dependent. Petnames is a chosen name for one
person by another person e.g. "dad" or "grandma".
2.5.2 What is the Petname Model?
We need to distinguish between a Petname Model and a Petname System.
The model is the idea of a system and its properties, while the system is an
implementation of the model.
A Petname Model is a way to relate a personal nickname to a globally
known identifier. It lets the user give their important services a personal
property, e.g. a name, picture, sound or any combinations of these [72].
One example of a Petname System is a phone book on a mobile phone [22].
When the phone is ringing it shows the name related to the number in the
phone book. A smart phone also allow the user to set specific ring- and
message tones as well as a picture to a contact.
The same can be done for a list of hostnames, by giving a personal text
or image for each website the user visits. An extra function that can be
performed in a Petname System is to check its list for similar hostnames
and warn the user about a possible phishing attack. It is not in the model
itself but would be a useful feature. There might also be possible to extend
the system to check cryptographic signatures in the Secure Sockets Layer
or other persistent information.
A Petname System can help the user to easily confirm that the service
is the same service as he or she already has cognitively authenticated. The
user would remember the authentication process that was done when the
Petname was created when it is shown. Such a remembrance will help the
user to get into the same mindset as when the authentication took place.
2.5.3 Requirements
Ferdous et al. describes multiple requirements for a Petname System
[22]. These are listed in Appendix B on page 97 and consist of Functional
Properties (in Table B.1) and Security Usability Properties (in Table B.3). The
Functional Properties consists of requirements to how the Petname System
should function. The first is the basis for the system, requiring that a
Petname System should at least have one set of Pointers and Petnames.
F2 states that Nicknames are optional. For Pointers to be resistant against
forgery is property F3. The last functional property (F4) is a one-to-one
bi-directional relation between the Pointer and the Petname within each
domain. However, F4 has been augmented in a later publication by some
of the authors [23]. In the new publication the authors have gone from a
strict bi-directional one-to-one mapping between the Petname and the Pointer,
to allow a bi-directional one-to-many mapping as long as the Pointer refers
to the same entity (see Table B.2 on page 97). The change is justified by
pointing out that one entity can have several pointers and the user should
be able to use the same Petname for the same entity.
The second category of properties is the Security Usability Properties
and focuses on the system-user interaction. These can be sorted into two
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subcategories Security Actions and Security Conclusions. The first describes
possible actions the user can perform in the system. The other are which
conclusions the user can arrive at using the information given by the
system.
The Security Usability Properties fits into the usability principles for
security proposed by Jøsang et al. in [44]. These are called Security Action
Usability Principles and Security Conclusion Usability Principles. Both of these
has four points as shown in Table B.3 and B.5 in Appendix B on page 97.
They are related to one another in a way that the action describes what
must be done by the user, and the conclusion describes how the user can
assess the security. For instance A2 requires that the user must have the
knowledge and ability to make the correct security action. C2 requires
that the system provides the information necessary to come to the correct
conclusion. A1 and C1 cover the user’s understanding of these principles.
A3 and C3 describe a tolerable mental and physical load by performing
an action or arriving at a conclusion. The two last principles are A4 and
C4 they cover the mental and physical load must be tolerable for multiple
actions and conclusions.
Some of these properties are relying on each other, e.g. the use of
Nicknames. F2 describes that the Nickname is optional. If this property
is not satisfied by a system, the system is non-compliant with a number of
other properties where the Nickname is the main or secondary focus.
2.5.4 Already existing tools
In [22] they evaluated two Petname System Add-Ons for the Mozilla
Firefox web browser, called Petname Tool and the TrustBar. These were
evaluated against the properties in Table B.1 and B.3 in Appendix B on
page 97. In Table 2.2 on the facing page there is a summery of how these
two systems satisfy the properties. Both systems allowed the user to add
the same Petname to different pointers, which contradict F4 as there is
no longer a one-to-one mapping. This also affect SA7 as the system does
not make sure if the new Petname is sufficiently different from existing
Petnames. They do not ask the user if he or she would like to add a Petname
for highly sensitive data, not meeting the requirement in the SA9 property.
The Petname Tool had some limitations. For example it was not
possible to enter nickname (F2) nor did it give the user any Petname
suggestions. It did alert the user if a new Petname was resembling an
already exiting one.
The TrustBar supported nicknames and provided Petname suggestions
based on these nicknames. It did not alert the user if the new Petname
resembles the Nickname or an already existing Petname.
As mentioned shortly in Section 1.5.1 on page 4, it has come to our
attention that both of these projects are no longer updated and can be
considered defunct. Petname Tool was last updated on the 30th of June 2009
[16]. The information page for TrustBar [35] was last updated late january
2006. It is likely that the development stopped around the same time.
It is hard to determine why these two projects are defunct. It might be
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F SA SC
System 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5
Petname Tool Y N Y N Y Y Y N N N N Y N Y Y Y N Y
TrustBar Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y N N N Y Y Y Y N
Table 2.2: Summary of how Petname Tool and TrustBar satisfies the
properties from Ferdous et al.
Figure 2.10: How a mobile Petname System is working
because of low number of users. Petname Tool is used by 179 users [16].
The reviews of this Add-On shows that it was attractive by users who
understood its purpose. The TrustBar was discontinued before Add-On
manager was released as a part of Firefox in the summer of 2008. There is
no information about the number of users for this Add-On.
The most likely reason is that the developers did not have the time
nor resources required to keep up with the development of these solutions
for new versions of Firefox. It has also been introduced a big number of
reputation services for web sites over the last years. Some of these services
are extensions to web browsers [7], others as search tools or even built in to
the browser [73, 62]. These solutions are being actively updated and may
have contributed to the decline in the popularity of the Petname Systems.
2.5.5 Mobile Petname System
Most users are moving between different computing platforms. We access
different platforms at work, at the university and at home. The amount of
work required to keep one set of Petnames updated on one platform can
be considered acceptable. The challenge arises when we introduce two or
more sets. It becomes hard to keep track of additions, deletions and other
changes that have been done in the different systems. This might even
render the browser specific systems unusable.
One solution for this is to make the system mobile, giving the user the
freedom to take his set of Petnames with him and use it on every computer
he interacts with. Figure 2.10 illustrates with a simple diagram of how this
Mobile Petname System works. Where the information about the request
is first sent to the OffPAD (1), the OffPAD sends its response back to the
computer (2). Depending on the result, the request is sent over the internet
(3) and get the requested data in return (4).
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2.6 Secure Mobile Devices
Jøsang and Pope describes in [43] a Personal Authentication Device (PAD).
It is a secure device external to the computer and is used as an identity
management system. The user authenticates himself to the PAD using a PIN-
code or other available methods. Which in turn starts a time- or connection
limited session, in which the PAD acts as the user’s identity manager and
can automatically authenticate the user to every supporting services. The
communication between the PAD and the service is done over a challenge-
response protocol through the user’s computer. The challenge is changed
every time to protect against replay attacks.
Klevjer et al. describes in [48] a more secure off-line PAD, an OffPAD. It
is a similar device to the PAD except that it should be mostly disconnected.
The OffPAD extends the PAD in another way as well. It can manage the
identities of service providers and authenticate them.
The reason why the OffPAD should be off-line as much as possible,
is to limit the exposure to potential attacks. The limited connectivity is
one of the requirements for an OffPAD and can be met by using physically
activated (contactless) communication. Other (live connections) means of
communications may be appropriate depending on the required assurance
level.
If an attacker should get his hands on the OffPAD there must be some
kind of access control on the device. The access control may be done
by using a PIN, pass phrase, biometrics or other adequate authentication
credentials which prevents unauthorized users from accessing the device.
It should also include a secure element to prohibit access to the information
on the device. The infrastructure for secure messaging and storage in a
secure element is described in ISO 7816-4 [38].
Klevjers three requirements for the OffPAD:
• Limited connectivity
• Secure element
• Access control
We also mention in [78] the need for the OffPAD to be tamper resistant.
This is to prevent an attacker with physical access to the device being able
to alter any of the OffPADs characteristics, e.g. make it possible for the
attacker to observe the usage of the device by adding components into it.
Laurie and Singer describe a similar device in [51]. The Nebuchadnezzar
as they call it, can be used in much the same way as a PAD. They
suggest it should run different security applications and give examples
of user authentication and transaction signing. The security requirements
specified for this device is aimed at the operating system and the
functionality. These requirements are quite important and should be
considered in the evaluation of a secure device.
The system requirements for the Nebuchadnezzar:
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• A non-spoofable user interface so the user knows what the device is
doing.
• An operating system that is built from the ground up to be secure.
• The device is not to be general purpose (e.g. it doesn’t run a web
browser).
• It must be able to do cryptography.
• It must be able to do asymmetric cryptography.
• It must interact with the user’s untrusted system.
• It must have a user interface.
• It must be updateable.
• It must be able to run multiple applications.
• It must have an absolutely bullet-proof kernel.
• It must be able to that attest to the software is running.
Another personal authentication device is the Pico by Frank Stajano.
This device is designed to replace passwords everywhere [71]. Stajano
focuses on user authentication in different environments e.g. on web
sites, unlocking a screen saver and logging into a computer. Pico requires
changes in server and computer applications to be usable.
He suggests a way to unlock the device by using what he calls
Picosiblings. These siblings can be any type of devices, they just have to
support the communication with the Pico. For instance watches, sunglasses
and even wigs. If the Pico is in proximity of a number of such devices then
the device is in a friendly environment and it unlocks.
Stajano describes the problem of getting this solution out into use with
a focus on the user. For a user to want to buy such a device, it has to be
supported by a wide range of services. To get service providers to support
this device it must either be simple to integrate or the number of interested
users must be considerable, preferably both. There is no working Pico
device at the moment, so it is a long way to go before the technology is
ready to be implemented into existing services.
Privacy in regard to an attacker’s possibility to identify persons using
this technology is not addressed. It is specified that it should not be
possible to infer identities or long-term pseudonyms from eavesdropping
on communication. Even with a protocol changing the address for the
Picosibling at a rapid interval, it is possible for an attacker to gather
information about the network of Pico-devices belonging to one person.
E.g. who is pico or sibling and number of siblings.
A possible denial of service attack, is to make enough radio interference
to break down communication between the Pico and its siblings. Consider
the following scenario. In an office building where every employee uses
a Pico device, an attacker sends powerful signals on the same frequency
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Bluetooth Medium range point-to-point communication.
NFC Short point-to-point connections over limited range.
Optical Using a camera to transfer data, range depending on
the resolution and size, normally 5-20 cm.
USB Wired connection, can also be used to charge the
device’s battery.
WiFi Communication over a bigger network, even over the
Internet.
ZigBee Longer point-to-point connections with low power
consumption and transmission range up to 100 m [8].
WirelessHART Industrial quality sensor networks.
Table 2.3: OffPAD communication technologies
used by Pico devices. It will disturb the connections between Pico and
its siblings, resulting in lock downs, disturbing every employee in their
work. The only way to limit the impact of such an attack would be to use
a frequency. Which has to be open for private use and does not travel well
through walls and windows. Such attacks might even be a precursor to a
spear-phishing attack.
2.6.1 Communication interfaces
The OffPAD needs to connect securely to a computer. It can be done over
secure channels or by securing insecure channels. Most of the technologies
available for such point-to-point connections are insecure in their nature.
We point out in [78] different communication interfaces or technologies
the OffPAD can use. These are listed in Table 2.3, including a new optical
option.
All these different communication technologies can in theory be used
by an OffPAD. The two security concerns that are most important to
address are eavesdropping and break-in attempts.
Bluetooth
Bluetooth has some built-in security mechanisms e.g. pairing and pseudo-
random frequency hopping. Which makes it difficult for an attacker to
listen to the communication, but not impossible. Michael Ossmann [77]
made a device capable of listening to Bluetooth communication.
Near Field Communication
Near Field Communication (NFC) builds upon the technology from radio-
frequency identification (RFID), where small amounts of data are sent from
a RFID tag to a reader. NFC has been developed to support data transfer
both ways. Because of the small amount of data, there is no inbuilt security
in the standard. The solution is to make a secure channel as proposed in
[34]. NFC is quite limited in distance. The entities can only communicate
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when they are a few centimetres between them. This physical limitation
makes it harder for an attacker to listen to the communication, but it is still
possible if a receiver is close enough.
Optical
To use a camera for the communication between two entities is quite
easy by using QR-codes or other methods for saving data in graphical
elements. It requires a camera and display on both entities to get a two-way
communication. A camera is not always available on the users computer,
so this is an inflexible method on different platforms.
USB
USB is available on virtually any computer and might be a good fall-back if
other technologies are unavailable. To connect the OffPAD to the computer
with a cable, takes away the Off in OffPAD. It introduces a possible security
vulnerability. As long as the OffPAD is connected, an attacker in the host
computer might be able to try a sequence of attacks towards the OffPAD.
WiFi
WiFi introduces some of the same vulnerabilities as with USB. The
difference is that USB is point-to-point, while WiFi can be many-to-many.
It makes it possible for an attacker to listen to the communication and
possibly attack the OffPAD. Even if the WiFi is secured in a number of
ways, the user needs to set up the WiFi connection on the OffPAD, which
can be a technical challenge and a mental load if it must be done often.
ZigBee
ZigBee is an open standard from the ZigBee Alliance [81]. If NFC is like
whispering to each other, ZigBee can be described as standing in a city
square and shout. So the problem with eavesdropping is substantial. It is
possible to add a "Trust Centre" to manage keys, although in adhoc peer-to-
peer communication this is not available. The alternative is to negotiate a
link key when setting up the connection, but this key will have to go in the
open [80]. ZigBee is simple to set up and have a low power consumption.
Communication can be done for a longer moment in time.
WirelessHART
WirelessHART is a wireless version of Highway Addressable Remote
Transducer (HART) and is an industrial standard for sending data between
smart devices and control- or monitoring system [25]. Smart devices are
intelligent field instruments with the capability to save temporary data and
route network traffic. It has built-in security, which requires a Security
Manager to generate, store, revoke, and renew keys [66]. Even if the
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Figure 2.11: The OffPAD and the OSI model
WirelessHART is superior to ZigBee in industrial applications [52], it is not
suitable for adhock networks with two communicating parties.
Interface summary
All off these technologies have potential security vulnerabilities. One way
to get around this is to encrypt all the data to and from the OffPAD.
Using asymmetrical cryptography can give the required security for the
connection. In Figure 2.11 there is a diagram of the OSI model. The model
can be used as a general model on how a communication system is built.
On the bottom we have the Physical layer, where the data is electrical pulses,
electromagnetic waves etc. The next layer is the Data Link layer, where
the information on the physical layer is translated to binary data. And
so it continues up to the Application layer, where the data is used in the
intended way. The data between the OffPAD and the application should
be encrypted and decrypted on the Application layer. This ensures that an
attacker in the system, e.g. in a device driver, can not read or alter the data.
In Table 2.4 on the next page, the different technologies are evaluated
with the requirements in mind. We can see in this table that the best
candidate is NFC. For the management of the device USB would be
preferred, as this would be directly connected to the computer and can also
be used to charge up the batteries of the OffPAD.
2.6.2 Mobile phone as the OffPAD
Advanced mobile phones, or smart phones, are able to run different user
installed applications and must be considered “general purpose computing
platform” by the definition in [51]. All the different platforms for smart
phones have simple solutions for users to install new applications. It
is also easy for developers to make and publish new software to users.
11NFC is getting incorporated into more and more devices every day.
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Large
Fast Short Short amount Readily
Type set up range connections of data available
Bluetooth X X
NFC X X X X X11
Optical X X X X
USB X X X X
WiFi X X
ZigBee X X
WirelessHART X
Table 2.4: Evaluation of communication technologies
As a consequence it also becomes easy for attackers to make malware
applications.
One of the organisations monitoring security, vulnerability and mal-
ware against mobile platforms is the Mobile Threat Center (MTC) in Juni-
per Networks Inc. MTC reported an 155 % increase in malware on mobile
phones from 2010 to 2011 [45]. They specified malware on mobile devices
to mostly consist of Spyware and Trojans. These are installed as a legitimate
applications by the user.
Different operating system manufacturers for mobile phones have a
difficult task to combine the request of new technology12 and keeping their
systems secure. Applications are also sandboxed, only getting access to
resources the operating system allows. Access to some of the resources
often requires user confirmation, e.g. geographical position and contacts.
The operating systems Windows Phone, iOS and Android, all support
device management. It gives organisations the opportunity to restrict
the functionality of the smart phone and stop the user from installing
unwanted and possibly harmful applications. They can also apply settings
to the operating system, which includes settings for network and email.
Apple [3] and Microsoft [57] has built support for device management13,
while Android uses third-party applications and systems.
On the other hand, the French company TazTag has introduced a mobile
phone (TPH-ONE) [74] based on Android. This phone has its own secure
hardware element which can be accessed in a secure way. Other phones
with a secure hardware elements exists, but this will be the first where
it is accessible to the developer of an application. Depending on the
implementation, the phone can be regarded as an OffPAD when the secure
element is activated.
12New technology often introduce new attack vectors and vulnerabilities.
13This service might require their own servers
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Chapter 3
General Discussion
In this chapter we will consider and evaluate the different technologies and
ideas brought up in Chapter 2 on page 9 Background in light of each other.
This chapter starts with a short discussions of Cognitive entity authentication.
We continue with an evaluation of the different technologies used for Server
authentication, before we briefly touch on the topic of Phishing. In Section 3.4
on page 46 we consider the Petname Model and the related requirements.
We will also propose several new properties to a Petname System. Lastly
we discuss Secure devices.
3.1 Cognitive Entity Authentication
Our definition of Cognitive entity authentication on page 13 is general and
can be used to describe human cognitive authentication of any entity.
One example in everyday life is when person A talks to a random
person B on the street. Person A is automatically identified by person B
as the entity because he or she can see the other person. Before person B
starts communicating, he or she tries to assess the nature of A and if it is
acceptable and safe to proceed.
The same process should be done by the user on websites. As persons
in real life, websites might be masquerading to be something they are not.
For instance there is no guarantee a person in a police uniform is in the
police and the website that looks like an on-line bank does not need to be a
bank.
In real life, as on the internet, persons can verify claims done by another
party. The difference lies in how we recognise a real life object and an
internet service. Here we touch on the essence of the problem we try to
remedy with the Petname System. We will discuss the Petname Model
further in Section 3.4 on page 46
3.2 Server Authentication
We have introduced different ways to authenticate servers. We can sort
them into two categories, automatic and manual. The focus in the security
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community is more on automatic solutions, e.g. SSL, probably because
such technologies is easily managed and general. When an automatic
solution is agreed upon it can be implemented in different systems and
over time every computer and device will support it. This is not the case
for systems in the manual category. They require education and training
of every user. The systems must also be simple enough so non-technical
persons can use them.
In the first category we find server certificate and DNSSEC, technolo-
gies that can without any user interaction determine if the identity of the
service is what it claims to be. In the manual category we find technologies
that enable the user to do cognitive entity authentication, e.g. personalisation
and Petname Systems. These require the interaction of a human being, as
they check if the service is what the user wants to access.
3.2.1 SSL certificates
There is a large number of CA-certificates in a web browser. If only one
of them gets compromised the entire security of the web browser is at
risk. The solution could have been the certificate revocation lists (CRL), but
because they are slowing down the web browser and the user experience it
is not used. The CRL might be a way for an attacker to find certificates that
has been compromised.
Security experts agree that traditional server certificates in the browser
PKI do not provide adequate protection. The only reason to continue to
use them is to encrypt the connection between the client and the server.
The certificate do not by themselves ensure confidentiality or integrity as
there is no guarantee that the certificate is correct.
3.2.2 DNSSEC
The solution to many of the security problems with the Domain Name
System is solved by DNSSEC. A successful DNS poisoning attack (see
Section 2.2.1 on page 16) could at the worst be a DoS-attack. It would even
stop authorities from guiding visitors from a website over to another by
changes performed in DNS.
One of the services affected by this change is the Child Sexual Abuse
Anti Distribution Filter (CSAADF), as this is based on locally changed
DNS-pointers [50]. At the moment all known domain names to sites
distributing child pornography is locally set to point to a web server
maintained by the internet service provider. The page that is shown to
visitors contains information about why it is shown, definition of child
sexual abuse and hyper links to relevant laws. After DNSSEC is introduced
the DNS will act like the domain does not exist.
It is only laziness from the domain registries that delays the introduc-
tion of DNSSEC. For instance the Norwegian registry NORID has just star-
ted discussions on how they should support DNSSEC in their systems.
It is not difficult to see that Norwegian Internet Service Providers would
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not support DNSSEC before Norwegian domain names are signed with
DNSSEC.
Another thing to consider is the trust of the Name Server administrat-
ors, as they would be the ones doing the signing.
DANE
Using the DNSSEC to secure the integrity of a service SSL certificate, would
be the strongest way to automatically assure the correctness of a certificate.
Even if this is not cognitive entity authentication, it would form a solid basis
for further checks.
When a situation like the one with DigiNotar (as described in Sec-
tion 2.2.2 on page 19) happens again, services using DANE will not be af-
fected. This depends also on the web browsers ability to validate DNSSEC
and DANE.
DANE could also set a stop for firewalls inspecting data going
through SSL-tunnels, because the firewall cannot change the information
in DNSSEC. From a privacy point of view this is a good solution, as the
data would be encrypted all the way from the client to the server. At the
same time it removes the possibility for the network administrator to look
for malware in the communication. As firewalls inspecting SSL-connection
also introduce a single point of failure, it is better to move to other methods
of malware detection.
3.2.3 Personalisation
To show the user some elements that they recognize as their own
information is a good practice. Personal information is often shown after
a user logs on to their on-line bank. Users will be able to see their current
balance and maybe a list over their accounts. This is also the case in web
mail and on-line forums. It is important to show the personalisation before
the user authentication is completed, so the user does not give away all the
information to an attacker. It could successfully be defined as a requirement
for services using personalisation to show this before the user’s password
is entered.
Images/Watermarks
Watermarks is a solution that is simple and fast for the user to validate. It
is easy for the service provider to support as it would only require an extra
field in the table over user data, describing colours or/and strings.
Yahoo’s solution is probably the best implementation yet, as their "sign-
in seal" is shown before the user enters their password and the data is not
available for other sites. The only drawback is that this solution considers
one web browser installation and not the user, so the user has to agree with
other users of the same computer what this seal should be. It must also
configured on each used computer.
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Figure 3.1: Third step for logging in with the Norwegian On-line banking
identification.
Time of last login
To show the time of last login requires that the user actually remembers
when their last login happened. This data is also often available in the user
database, which makes it easy to show to the user.
The Norwegian On-line banking identification (BankID) shows the time
of last successful login after the user name and the one time password, but
before the user enters his or hers personal password. It is the third step and
is shown in Figure 3.1. The user can, if vigilant, check if the time is shown
and is correct before entering their password.
The Norwegian E-identity (MinID) shows this after the user has given
the personal identity number and password, but before entering the one
time password. In Figure 3.2 on the facing page it is a screen shot of
the form where the user should enter a one time password sent by SMS.
Here the user can also see that the last time he or she logged on with these
credentials was on the 14th of November 2012. If this is not correct the user
can stop the authentication process and contact the authorities to check.
Vulnerabilities
There are mainly two ways to do a phishing attack on sites with
personalisation. The first is to send the information through the phishing
site to the correct service and return what the user expects to see, i.e. man
in the middle. It can be used for spear phishing, where the number of
users and tries are limited. Many of the service providers do check logs
for abnormality and would probably react to many complete or login tries
from one IP-address.
The other way is to just remove it and optionally include a message
saying the system is being updated. For example if the time of last login
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Figure 3.2: Second step for logging in with the Norwegian E-identity.
was missing in Figure 3.2, it would probably have gone unnoticed by most
of the users. This is backed up by the research of Schechter et al. in [68].
The only way to fool the users of the Sign-In seal (used by Yahoo), is to
remove the seal and add a message that the system is unavailable or being
updated.
The security minded person would probably notice missing security
elements, that everyone else probably would not. It would make person-
alisation a simple, cheap and a somewhat unreliable service authentication
solution.
3.3 Phishing
It is clear from the numbers shown by APWG in Section 2.4 on page 25,
that phishing attacks is a massive challenge and will probably continue
growing in the future. It is found all over the Internet, in emails, websites,
social media and instant messaging.
When it comes to protection against phishing attacks, we have four
types of persons:
• Those who are aware of the danger of such attacks that would use the
protection mechanisms available.
• Those who are aware of the danger and are of the opinion that they
can take care of themselves.
• Those who thinks "this do not happen to me".
• Those who are ignorant of the issue.
The two first would be the most careful using the internet, as they are aware
of the danger. The last group can be educated to be aware of the threat. This
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type of education and information can be given by banks, employers and
other service providers.
The hardest group of people to protect would be those who think it does
not happen to them and it would be difficult to convince them otherwise.
The most likely reason is that when a person uses the internet, he would
notice the poor phishing attacks as phishing attacks. If he comes across a
good attack he would not notice it. Providing the person with a somewhat
less impression of the real danger and the attitude that he or she can spot
all phishing attempts.
3.4 The Petname Model
The Petname Model introduces a way for the user to link their personal
relation to a service. It would be hard for an attacker to mimic the service in
a Petname System. With the domain name system in mind, in the literature
the Nickname has been described as optional by Ferdous et al. [22] and as
the same as Pointer by Stiegler [72]. The most logical approach in is the one
proposed by Stiegler, as the Pointer is the domain name and is normally
used as a Nickname for a website.
To do such assumptions would not do any change to Zooko’s triangle
in itself. However it makes it hard to visualise the triangle. The DNS is
a naming system that in a small world without malicious intent, would
satisfy all three properties; Global, Securely unique and Memorable. Since we
have both numerous companies with the same name and people trying to
fool users on the internet, the DNS misses on the Memorable property. Not
in the same way other naming systems, who misses because it is actually
hard to remember the name. It is because the DNS is prone to mimicking,
where a domain name can with purpose be made to resemble another
domain name.
The DNS does not fit the Petname Model completely when we think
of the domain name as both a Pointer and Nickname. As the problem of
mimicking is not clearly addressed in the model. If we follow the definition
used by Ferdous et al., setting domain name as the Pointer and the Nickname
optional, the DNS will suite the Petname Model better. Although we would
lose the Memorable property to the domain name which is clearly present.
It is easier to put the DNS in to the confines of the Petname Model than the
other way around.
Either way the Petname as a connection between Memorable and Securely
unique and not Global, is not effected by the discussion if a domain name
is Memorable. A personal Petname is ideal to keep track of personal
connections to a service.
3.4.1 Petname requirements
The properties for Petname Systems described by Ferdous et al. in [22] is
made with a different kind of Petname System in mind. They require some
amendments to be suitable for an external Petname System. The Functional
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Properties describe the base for the Petname Model and will be the same
for every implementation. It might be interesting to remove the property
stating that Nickname is optional, as it does not give any higher security and
might be easily forged. Especially if it is the title for a web page that would
be used as a basis for the Nickname.
The same cannot be said for the Security Usability Properties, where the
Security Conclusions describe a system placed into the web browser, giving
a new instance for each window and tab. SC1 says "The Pointer and the
corresponding Petname must be displayed at all times through the user interface
of the Petname System.". Such a requirement is difficult for an external
device, as it can show requests from different windows and tabs. In Google
Chrome it might be possible to determine which window and tab that is
active, allowing the Petname System to only react to requests in this tab.
It rises a new question, what about the requests done in other windows or
tabs. Should these just be ignored or should the Petname System check all
request in the same way?
Here we need to consider the development of the content on the
internet. All new websites use techniques to make their pages as dynamic
and fast as possible. One of the techniques used is background requests,
which enables a website to interact with the server without reloading the
page. If a site is vulnerable to cross-site-scripting, an attacker could insert a
script that copies the user name and password and send it to a server after
the page loses focus (change of window or tab). Petname System should
also be able to control requests done in the background.
Following the argument above a new Security Conclusion has to be
formed. The goal of SC1 is to make the user confident of the interaction
and able to draw the security conclusion easily, to achieve this the Petname
System has to check background connections for all open sites. This
establishes the basis for NSC1.
NSC1 The user should be informed if a Petname is accessed in a
background process.
When opening a web page a number of different servers can be used.
For instance when requesting content from Content Delivery Networks. Then
it is important to not only check what is placed in the address bar of the web
browser, but also check every request. The user should be informed if a
web page with a specified Petname accesses a web server related to another
Petname. We define the property NSC2 to cover such cases. A web page can
also connect to servers which do not have an associated Petname. It can be
an indication of an attack and the user must explicitly allow the request to
continue. To handle this we define the conclusion property NSC3 and the
action property NSA1 on the following page.
NSC2 The user should be informed if a web page with a Petname sends
data to a server on another Petname.
NSC3 The user should be alerted if a web page with a Petname sends data
to a server without a Petname.
47
NSA1 It is required by the user to do an explicit action to allow a request
from a web page with a Petname to a server without.
3.4.2 Similar pointers
As most of phishing attacks depend upon mimicry of an on-line service,
the Petname System should also check for similarities in the pointer to
already existing Petnames. If such similarities are found the user should be
alerted and required to take an explicit action to make a decision to allow
or disallow the request. It raises the question if the action should be saved
for future automatic decision making. For example when a user allows a
request to a different, but at the same time similar, Pointer. It is saved as
another pointer to the same entity. It would be useful in cases when the
service uses multiple servers, content delivery networks, or both.
It is allowed to add multiple pointers to the same Petname in the func-
tional properties and therefore should be supported in the Security Actions
and Security Conclusions. So we introduce the two new properties NSA2
and NSC4.
NSA2 The user should be able to add several Pointers to the same
Petname.
NSC4 The user should be alerted if a pointer is very similar to an already
existing pointer.
3.5 Secure Devices
The Pico device is interesting. However it is too specific to be used
with a Petname System. The only focus is to replace passwords and the
related infrastructure in computers and websites. The idea of unlocking the
device in friendly environments sounds promising. However it needs to be
developed with regard to privacy and denial of service attacks. Although
Stajano describes that the picosiblings can be a large set of personal everyday
things, it is unlikely that production of normal clothing, watches and
glasses would include such devices. A more likely approach would be
to make a range of different size devices that the user could themselves
incorporate in to their possessions.
Neither the OffPAD nor the Nebuchadnezzar are complete solutions,
i.e. they are ideas for a device not produced yet. The requirements
could be a good starting point to make a device specification and designs.
Unfortunately this is an expensive process which requires an organisation
that is willing to use the device and a large number of them.
3.5.1 Device cost
The cost of an OffPAD is important to consider. A simple one-time-
password calculator used by different service providers cost about 8 $1 a
1DIGIPASS GO 3, when ordering 5005 units or more
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piece and is very easy to implement in existing systems.
The TazCard which is very similar to what we look for in an OffPAD,
was discontinued because of production costs. It requires a large quantity
of devices to get the cost per unit down to an acceptable level.
Here we encounter the problem of device cost. It is hard to price a
device that does not exist on the market today and what would be an
acceptable price for one single device? The cost of a device must be justified
by the services it delivers. A company would not buy a device that cost 120
$, when they can get the same service from a device to 8 $.
The Petname System by itself is not the service that would justify an
expensive device. However as an application among several others on the
same device the price might be considered as acceptable.
3.5.2 Potential users
Banks are likely candidates to support such secure devices, but because of
the cost probably only for their high risk customers and employees.
An OffPAD would be interesting for the types of companies who
need to ensure the security of their systems. As this device give them
the opportunity to make their own applications that fits their needs and
requirements. A company might be interested to pay extra for a device like
this, since most of the devices available has limited access for developers.
3.5.3 Secure communication
On the first use of the OffPAD with a specific application they need to be
paired to each other. In this process it should also exchange cryptographic
keys. Prior to the pairing, the OffPAD and the application cannot have any
form for secure connection. Since the parring process is based on Trust-On-
First-Use (TOFU)2 it has to be done with some care. It can be a several step
process as shown in Figure 3.3 on the next page. It consists of three parts:
Securing temporary communication channel, identifying the end-points,
and long time key exchange. The first part is a Diffie-Helman key exchange
[20], which is a temporary key used only for the pairing process. It should
be done automatically when a user initialises pairing.
Part two requires the user to manually transfer data from the OffPAD
to the application. It is at this point in time that the OffPAD ensures that
the communicating party is the application. At the same time that it is
the application the user wants to use and not a man-in-the-middle. The
process should be a simplified version of the first key exchange, where the
application sends its key to the OffPAD and the OffPAD shows its key and
a random value to the user. When the key and value is entered into the
application, the common key is calculated, the random value is encrypted
and transferred to the OffPAD. If the value is correct, the OffPAD does the
last part and sends a unique asymmetric key to the application, making the
pairing complete. It should be an easy operation for the user to remove the
2also known as leap-of-faith
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User OffPAD Application
Start
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Common part (p, g)
OffPAD part (gamodp)
Application parts(gbmodp)
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Random value
D(key, value)
Part two
Unique key
Part three
1
Figure 3.3: Diagram for how the key exchange could be done.
The application is in the client terminal.
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pairing from either the application (to forget the OffPAD), or the OffPAD
(to forget the Application).
Even with an encrypted connection, the OffPAD should remain offline as
much as possible. All the different technologies that give long connections
should be restricted. In fact, the OffPAD should only be connected when
the user needs to authenticate and for the management of the device3. Since
most of the usage of an OffPAD is for short periods of time, it should be
easy and fast for the user to set up and tear down the connection. Having a
short range of the communication, both physical and virtual, is preferable
as this limits the opportunity of eavesdropping and discovery by others.
If an attacker knows who you are and when you used your device it can
be used as a way to build up trust in a social engineering attack. Another
requirement of the technology is that it is able to transfer a large amount of
data to and from the OffPAD.
3Updating the device, backup and application management (add/remove)
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Chapter 4
Technical Description
In this chapter we will describe the technical solution for the complete
Petname System. We start with our choices in the design of the system
and a description of the device used for the prototype. We continue
with a discussion of the implementation of the Petname Model, which
also includes an evaluation of our system with regard to the properties
discussed in Section 3.4.1 on page 46. This chapter ends with a description
of the different components in our Petname System.
4.1 Design Choices
A Petname System can be relatively extensive and difficult to design, so we
did some limiting choices to be able to finish in time. The most important
will be discussed in this section.
4.1.1 Filtering requests
Our Petname System only considers the domain names to the different
websites. It is simple and effective as every domain name will be checked.
If the attacker uses a completely unrelated domain name, the user will be
asked if he or she wants to add a new Petname for this domain.
To limit the number of request the Petname System has to check, it
will only check POST requests. This type of requests is normally used to
send data to a server. The other type is GET requests, which is normally
used to get data. A website can have numerous GET requests as most
of the items are downloaded this way. By doing this selection it limits
the number of checks by the Petname System and there by reducing the
number interactions required by the user.
Website developers unfortunately use POST requests to do other
functions than just the sending of user data. Any POST-request would be
checked by our Petname System, which in turn might require some action
from the user. If the number of actions required by the user gets to large
it will be a source of mental overload. Resulting in that the user no longer
cares about what the system does.
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To only check POST requests is a simple solution to a hard problem. It is
easy for an attacker to make a site that sends the user name and password
in a GET-request and in that way circumvent the Petname check. The
reason for not designing a smarter way to determine when the Petname
System should check is that it is hard to identify user data among all the
information going to and from the server. There is no easy way for web
browsers, or site independent systems to determine what the data is or
should be. The data can be a user name, a password, a search field or what
page to view. It is possible for an attacker to disguise a password so it is
impossible to identify it as the user’s password.
4.1.2 Connection type
Our prototype will, against the idea of the OffPAD, be connected with the
host computer with USB. The reason for this decision is that a standalone
Petname System must be running continuously to have the desired effect.
If the system was combined with some kind of user authentication it could
just be doing service authentication at the same time or just before the
OffPAD authenticated the user.
4.1.3 Web browser selection
All the major web browsers have some kind of support for extensions. How
this is implemented and developed varies largely in each of them. We
needed a web browser where it was simple to develop extensions and at
the same time allowed us to do changes in the request handling, e.g. access
and block connections.
Internet Explorer was out of the question as it was hard to find any
information about how extensions could handle requests. To develop for
Safari, Apple requires that the developer register before getting access to
development resources. This combined with the small amount of Safari
users on windows, stopped us to go further into this web browser.
We wanted to use the Norwegian web browser Opera. Even if it is easy
to find information about how to develop extensions for Opera it did not
support request handling in extensions. We contacted the developers of
Opera just to check if we were missing some information, they suggested
we use Google Chrome. We also considered Firefox. It allows extensions to
inspect the headers, but Google Chrome was more development friendly.
4.2 System Design
The system can be described by two state machines. One for the browser
extension and one for the Petname System. These are strong guides for the
rest of development. We will now describe both of them before going into
further details of the Petname System.
Figure 4.1 on the next page is the state machine model for the browser
extension. Starts by waiting until it gets a New Request. In the Filter the
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Figure 4.1: State machine for browser extension
GET request gets automatically OK, POST requests is sent (Send) to the
Petname System for evaluation. If the Petname System returns OK the request
is accepted, if it returns BLOCK the request is blocked. Then it returns to
Wait.
The workings of the Petname System is modelled in Figure 4.2 on the
following page. The Petname System waits for a New query to be received
from the browser extension. When it is received the Petname System
performs a Lookup in the database. It can give one of three results; Complete
match, No/weak match or Strong match.
Complete match The user is Notified. At the same time the Petname
System send the OK message in return to the web browser.
No/weak match The user is asked if he or she wants to add it as a new
Petname. Without waiting for an answer the Petname System sends
the OK message to the web browser.
Strong match The user is shown the domain name of the current request
as well as the matching Petname information1. The user can choose
to let the request continue, which results in that OK is returned to
the web browser. If the user chooses to stop the request, a BLOCK
message is returned.
After a message is returned to the web browser the Petname System
goes back to Wait.
1Domain name and Petname.
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Figure 4.2: State machine for Petname System
4.3 Device
As this master thesis project is a part of the LUCIDMAN-project, we used
a product from TazTag, namely the TazCard. It is a small pad (7.0 x 9.8 cm)
with a simple Linux distribution and able to run Java Applets, see image in
Figure 4.3. It has several communication interfaces: USB, NFC and ZigBee,
as well as slots for micro SD card and a smartcard in the same size as a
SIM-card.
Figure 4.3: Image of TazCard.
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For communication between the computer and the TazCard we used
the USB connection, as this was what we had available on the host
computer. It also made the project a bit easier to implement, as the USB
connection automatically registers itself as a network connection on the
host computer. This enabled us to run the Petname server, described in
detail in Section 4.5.4 on page 66, directly in the TazCard. If we had to use a
ZigBee connection we would have to make a simple proxy server running
on the host computer interacting with the device driver.
Regrettably, the production of this device is discontinued due to high
production costs. It was the main factor making this project more abstract,
giving us the goal to make the system as portable as possible. The TazCard
was still used for prototyping and testing as this device is the closest thing
we have to an OffPAD.
4.4 Implementation of the Petname Model
The system itself is implemented as one Java class with subclasses to make
it easy to include in other projects and onto other devices. The class does
not include any user interfaces, as this largely depends on the hardware
available and how it should be used in a project. The class is flexible and
platform independent and can be included in every user authentication
project to add service authentication.
4.4.1 The database class
The database in the Petname System is simple. It can be regarded as a
combination of key-value and document database. Key-value databases
gives a value in return for the given key and document database has several
fields per entry. The key is essential for all the functions in the database,
since the key points to a record. A record has three elements; key, title and
value. In the prototype, only the key and title fields is actively used. The
key is the domain name and the title is the Petname. Values are intended
to enable the database to save extra data about a site, e.g. certificate hash,
normal login path and so on.
The database has five functionalities, insert a record, delete an existing
record, update a record, select a record based on key and list all records in
the system.
Insert
To insert a record, the system makes a new record object where the key title
and value is set. When the record is ready to be saved, it is passed to the
database which saves it to file.
The record should not have the same key as an already existing record,
as during a select the first found record with this key will be returned.
Because we check the keys in the user interface and do not give the user
the opportunity to add Petnames with the same key, there is no check on
duplicate keys at the moment.
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Figure 4.4: A representation of a Key-Value database as implemented in
this class.
Delete
There are two ways to delete a record; by key or by object. When using
an object the whole record has to be equal before the record is deleted. If
only the key is provided, the database finds the record associated with this
key and then do the same as when deleted by object. It is more secure to
compare the complete records, as the developer can be sure it is the correct
record that is deleted. This is done even if the Petname System does not
allow a user to add two records with the same key.
Update
When updating a record in the database, one record replaces an old record
with the same key. The simplest way to use this function is to first select
one record. Do the modifications required on the title or value, and send
the record object to the update function.
List All
The List All function returns all records as an array. It is useful to keep
track of records in the database. The function is used to generate the list of
Petnames shown on the settings page in the prototype.
Select
There are two select functions. The first is an exact select. It will only
return a record if the correct key is found, otherwise it returns a null value.
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Real string Possible fake string
google.com g00g1e.com
GOOGLE.COM G00GLE.COM
UiO.no Ui0.no
dnb.no dn6.no
Table 4.1: Examples of similar strings.
The second function uses the string comparison algorithm described in
Section 4.4.2. It returns the closest match to the key, if the string comparator
returns 20 or lower. It returns a null value if no match is found.
The Petname System first tries to find a record with the same key. If this
is successful, it returns the record that matches. Otherwise it uses the select
function to find a similar record. If a record is found it is shown to the user
as a suspicious site. If no similar record is found, the Petname System ask
if it should be added.
Writing and reading data
Because of the lack of documentation for file handling on TazCard, the
database file is deleted and fully written every time a record is inserted
or updated. Then the database file is reloaded into the database class.
This is not the optimal way to do database file saving. A smarter and
more efficient way would be to have a record state bit that determines if the
record was deleted. If the record was deleted then the bit could be written
to zero. New records could be added to the end of the file.
If a record was updated, the database would first delete the existing
record and then insert the modified record as if it was a new record. Once
in a while, depending on the amount of space available, the database would
do a clean up. Rewriting the whole database and remove deleted records.
4.4.2 String comparison
The heart of the system is the string comparison function. The purpose of
this function is to find similar strings based on characters that are optically
similar. The similarity depends on the font type being used. Most fonts
used in web browsers today have distinct characters. However people are
still mistaking the upper case letter "O" for the number zero and the lower
case letter "l" for the number one. In Table 4.1 there are some examples
of how a real domain name can be faked by an attacker and possibly not
noticed by a user.
As there are multiple characters that look quite similar, the function
should be able to evaluate the graphical likeness between two characters.
By making a predefined lookup matrix where every two characters have an
optical relation value, it is possible to make an optical string comparison. In
Table 4.2 on the next page a part on the lookup matrix made for this project
is shown. Here we can see that the relation value is in the range of zero to
nine, where zero is regarded as an equal character and nine is a completely
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A B C D E F G H I J K L 1 2 3 4 5 6
A 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 9 9
B 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
C 9 9 0 9 9 9 3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
D 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
E 9 9 9 9 0 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 6 9 9 9
F 9 9 9 9 2 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
G 9 9 3 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 2
H 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
I 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 1 9 9 9 9 9
J 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
K 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
L 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 1 9 9 9 9 9
1 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 1 9 9 1 0 9 9 9 9 9
2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9 9
3 9 9 9 9 6 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9 9
4 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9 9
5 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0 9
6 9 9 9 9 9 9 2 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 0
Table 4.2: Part of the predefined lookup matrix for characters
different character. The default value for a relation is nine. The lookup
matrix is implemented as a two-dimensional array, with two characters as
the keys for one single value.
A simplified version of the function takes two strings and checks each
character in one string against the character in the same position in the
lookup matrix. The value of each lookup is added and multiplied by a
hundred, then divided nine times the length of the longest string. The
calculation gives a number between one and a hundred which indicates the
difference between those two strings. If the returned value is zero means
equal strings and a hundred means total different strings.
Listing 4.1 on the facing page shows the pseudo code for the simplified
function. On line 2 and 3 it gets the length of the shortest and longest
string. It is used in line 4 where the difference in string length is weighted
by multiplying the difference with nine. Then each character in these two
strings is compared in the lookup matrix in line 8. On line 9, the percentage
is calculated and returned.
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Listing 4.1: Simplified comparison function
1 function compare(s1, s2):
2 minlength := min(length(s1), length(s2))
3 maxlength := max(length(s1), length(s2))
4 val := (minlength -maxlength )*9
5 for i = 0 to minlength:
6 char1 := s1[i]
7 char2 := s2[i]
8 val := val + lookup[char1 ][char2]
9 Return floor((val *100)/( maxlength *9))
The complete version also takes the possibility for added or removed
characters in the strings. E.g. "petname" and "apetname" will be returned
as equal. The offset can be in the middle of the strings, it will make the
function to return zero on the two strings "petname" and "petaname". How
the function does this is shown in line 18 and 22 in listing 4.2. Where the
current char in the first string is compared with the last and the next in
second string. The comparison is done three times and the one with the
least relation value is chosen.
Listing 4.2: Complete function to compare strings
1 public int compare(String st1 , String st2) {
2 if (st1.equalsIgnoreCase(st2)) {
3 return 0;
4 }
5 int tmpres;
6
7 char[] s1 = st1.toCharArray ();
8 char[] s2 = st2.toCharArray ();
9
10 int maxlen = Math.max(s1.length , s2.length );
11 int minlen = Math.min(s1.length , s2.length );
12
13 int maxval = 9 * maxlen;
14 int val = (maxlen -minlen )*9;
15
16 for (int idx = 0; idx < minlen; idx ++) {
17 tmpres = 9;
18 if (idx > 0) {
19 tmpres = Math.min(tmpres , lm[s1[idx ]][s2[idx -1]]);
20 }
21 tmpres = Math.min(tmpres , lm[s1[idx ]][s2[idx ]]);
22 if (idx < (minlen -1)) {
23 tmpres = Math.min(tmpres , lm[s1[idx ]][s2[idx +1]]);
24 }
25 val += tmpres;
26 }
27
28 return ((val * 100) / maxval );
29 }
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4.4.3 Validating Petname requirements
When validating the system against the requirements in [22], we will
focus on Functional Properties and Security Usability Properties. All the
requirements are listed in Appendix B on page 97.
Security Usability Properties in Table B.4 on page 98 consist of two types
of properties, Security Actions (prefixed with SA) and Security Conclusions
(prefixed with SC). The difference between these are mainly that the
Security Action is something the user does, while Security Conclusions is
something the user thinks.
Functional Properties
We start with the Functional Properties in Table B.1 on page 97. Both F1 and
F4 are fulfilled as the pointer has a one-to-one relation to the Petname. Since
a domain name can be regarded as a Pointer as well as a Nickname, F2 is
also fulfilled. F3 need DNSSEC to be sufficiently met, as the SSL certificate
is neither foolproof nor permanent as discussed in Section 2.2.2 on page 18.
Security Action
We will now look closer on how this Petname System meets these Security
Usability Properties from Table B.4 on page 98 in Appendix B on page 97. As
it is the user who needs to add the Petname for the system to recognise it,
both SA1 and SA2 is satisfied. The user can also edit their Petname for a
service in the settings page which is required by SA3.
SA4 proposes that the system should be able to suggest the Petname
based on the Nickname of the service. It is not implemented, as it is hard
to automatically generate Petnames from Nicknames without these being
somewhat similar. As there is no support for Petname suggestion there
is no need to implement SA5, where the user has to accept the suggested
Petname with explicit action.
Both SA6 and SA7 set requirements to the similarity between names,
SA6 for the Petname and the Nickname and SA7 for one Petname compared
another Petname. It is not activated in our Petname System. However
it can easily be done with the string comparison function described in
Section 4.4.2 on page 59. The explicit warning required by SA8 when the
user chooses a Petname that is similar to a Nickname or other Petnames,
is also not implemented in this system. It is possible to do a similar string
comparison between the Petnames and other elements as used to compare
keys.
In SA9 the user should be encouraged to add a Petname for a service
that handles highly sensitive data. It is not implemented as it is not possible
to automatically infer the sensitivity of the data being handled. It is not a
good solution to check if there is a SSL certificate and the complexity of the
algorithm. Everyone that wants a SSL certificate can buy one and the grade
of its cryptographic complexity is not related to the level of sensitivity of
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the data. The system asks the user if he or she would like to add a Petname
every time it suspects a user name or password on an unknown service.
Security Conclusion
In this project we choose to show all passing POST-request. It is hard to
combine with SC1 without effecting the user interface in a negative way.
SC1 requires the pointer and the corresponding Petname to be displayed
at all times through the user interface of the Petname System. To do this
would result in several Petnames showing at the same time, making it hard
for a user to notice changes. In a web browser-based Petname System the
information can be given in the same place for every tab in the browser.
In this system when a Petname is accessed the screen changes color
and the Petname is displayed for 5 seconds, somewhat satisfying SC2. It
requires the Petname to be clearly visible for the user and grab the user’s
attention.
For the same reason already mentioned, there is no static indication
for missing Petname for the pointer currently in use on the computer. So
this Petname System does not satisfy SC3 directly. However a suspected
malicious requests is paused until the user gives his or hers approval.
In normal use Petnames and Nicknames do not show at the same time,
fulfilling SC4.
The requirement of SC5 is to clearly warn the user if any of the prior
properties is directly violated. In this system every action in the Petname
System is clearly shown on the OffPAD, but since it is on an external device
it might get out of view.
The new properties
We proposed some new properties in Section 3.4.1 on page 46, as
amendments to the Security Action and Security Conclusion properties. These
amendments were developed after our Petname System was finished.
Our Petname System does not consider the owner of the request, so it
does not satisfy NSC2 on page 47 and NSC3 on page 47. However it will
check requests done in the background, so the system satisfies NSC1 on
page 47. Because the user is not warned about the request from a Petname
managed site to a non-managed site, he or she can not perform the action
required in NSA1 on page 48.
The system does not allow the user to add more than one Pointer per
Nickname, as required by NSA2 on page 48. It was not included as it
would require a more complex database. NSC4 on page 48 is satisfied as
this system looks for similarities between the used key and existing keys.
Summary
To summarise how our Petname System is compared to the properties in
[22] listed in Appendix B on page 97. It is also shown in the beginning
of Table 4.3 on the next page. Our Petname System only satisfies half
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F SA SC NSA NSC
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 1 2 3 4
Y Y N Y Y Y Y N N N N N N N Y N Y Y N N Y N N Y
Table 4.3: Summary of how our Petname System compares against the
properties from [22] and our new properties.
of the requirements, because these requirements is designed with an in-
browser Petname System in mind. Where a user can have one instance of
the Petname System for each Tab in each web browser process. While in
our Petname System has the same instance for every open tab and has to
be able to give feedback for each of them at the same time. There are also
some of the requirements that is a continuation of optional requirements,
e.g. SA4 and SA5.
Our system does not have all the properties we have proposed ourself.
It is mostly because these properties were developed after we had seen how
our Petname System worked. The only exception was NSC4 on page 48,
which has been an idea from the start of this project.
4.5 Prototype
Our prototype incorporates the complete Petname System. It consists of
two physical parts; the device and the computer. The device handles most
of the processing and interaction happens. While in the computer it is
manly the browser extension acting like a gateway between the internal
processes in the browser and the device.
4.5.1 Overview
Client Terminal OPAD
Web browser
Petname 
extension
USB-network
driver
HTTP-server
User InterfacePetname
manager
Database
String comparison
Figure 4.5: Prototype overview.
The prototype consists of six parts as shown in Figure 4.5; The Petname
extension, Petname manager, User Interface, Database, HTTP-server and
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the USB-network driver. The arrows show how these different parts
communicate with each other.
In the web browser it is only the Petname extension that is installed. It
works by filtering out the GET-requests and send the rest to the external
Petname System, as explained in Section 4.1.1 on page 53. The workings of
this extension is described in Section 4.5.5 on page 68. The web browser is
not changed in any other way.
The USB-network driver is a standard driver from Microsoft, called
Remote Network Driver Interface Specification (NIDS) [56], which can be
described as Ethernet over USB. As long as a device reports it has this
capability, Microsoft Windows will use this driver. It is developed as
a simple way to interface different devices without the need to install a
specific driver. As the TazCard supports this, it is easy to program a server
on the TazCard to take care of the communication with the host computer
and applications. Because of this capability there was no need to make a
separate application to run on the computer to interface to the device. Such
an application would probably be required if the communication should
go over another type of interface, e.g. NFC or ZigBee.
To communicate with the Petname extension in the browser we have
a HTTP-server included in the Petname System. It is used as the
communication interface. The server is simple and works only with the
Petname manager. It is described in detail in Section 4.5.4 on the following
page. The Petname manager is the part that manages all the operations of
the system. It decides what to show on the user interface depending on the
result from the database. The database is an instance of the class already
described in Section 4.4.1 on page 57. The user interface is a set of frames
and controls to interact with the user.
4.5.2 Petname manager
The Petname manager is the main component of our Petname System.
It decides what the user interface should display, what kind of actions
should be performed in the database, interact with the HTTP-server. In
two cases the Petname manager get commands from the user interface,
when the user wants to access the settings page or close the application.
When the user accesses the settings page, the Petname manager gives the
User Interface the database handle. It is done to simplify the process of
deletions and editing of existing Petnames. This is illustrated with the grey
arrow between the user interface and database in Figure 4.5 on the facing
page.
When a request to check a Petname is received from the Petname
extension by the internal HTTP-server. It notifies the manager, which
queries the database. Depending on the result from the database, the
manager gives what the HTTP-server should respond with. In the case
where an explicit action from the user is required, will this response wait
on the User Interface. In all the other cases, the response will be sent at the
same time as the user is informed.
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Figure 4.6: Waiting screen on our Petname System.
4.5.3 User interface
The user interface for the prototype is simple by design so not to disturb the
user. When the application starts, the "waiting" screen appears, as shown
in Figure 4.6. It gives the user the opportunity to go to the settings page to
edit or remove existing Petnames.
When the system gets a request to check a domain name, one of three
actions can happen depending on the result from the database. If the
domain name exists in the Petname System, the Petname is displayed and
the background colour is changed for about five seconds. If the domain
name is similar to an existing domain name, a warning is displayed where
the user can select if he wants to continue or stop the transaction. The last
action is where the domain name do not exist nor any similarity is found.
The user then gets the opportunity to add this domain name to the Petname
System.
As the TazCard did not have any keyboard, we had to develop a way for
the user to edit text fields on the device. It was done by drawing a keyboard
on the screen with a text box to see what they wrote. The keyboard is shown
in Figure 4.7 on the facing page. It has some limitations compared to what
is available on smart phones, but it is sufficient.
4.5.4 Device server
To enable communication between the Petname extension in the web
browser, a HTTP-server was made. In our prototype this was located in
the OffPAD as a part of the Petname System.
The server in the Petname System is working like a very simple HTTP
server. One reason for running a HTTP-server instead of a simpler server
is because a HTTP request is easily done from a browser extension, and
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Figure 4.7: Keyboard for the prototype
Listing 4.3: Typical client request
1 GET / HTTP/1.1
2 Accept : t e x t /html , a p p l i c a t i o n /xhtml+xml , a p p l i c a t i o n . . .
3 Accept−Charset : ISO−8859−1, utf −8;q = 0 . 7 , * ; q =0.3
4 Accept−Encoding : gzip , d e f l a t e , sdch
5 Accept−Language : en−US, en ; q =0.8
6 Cache−Control : max−age=0
7 Connection : keep−a l i v e
8 User−Agent : Mozil la /5.0 (Windows NT 6 . 1 ; WOW64) App . . .
9 X−Petname−Key : webmail . uio . no
it is widely supported. The server does not serve any content at the
moment e.g. web pages or images. It only response to requests containing
a Petname key. There is no problem to extend this service in the future, e.g.
if a Petname has an assigned image this can be shown in the web browser.
The client follows the convention2 of using "X-" in front of its custom
experimental HTTP parameters [67]. The Petname key is transferred by the
parameter "X-Petname-Key", the content of this parameter is the accessed
domain name.
By sending a HTTP-request (see listing 4.3) with the domain name to
the server in the OffPAD, the server starts the Petname check. It returns a
valid HTTP-response with either "OK" or "BLOCK" like in listing 4.4 on the
following page. It can take some time before it is returned, as the Petname
manager might wait for an action from the user.
If this system should communicate over NFC or ZigBee, the HTTP-
server could run on the computer, which sends the information through the
2This convention is not recommended for systems in widely use [67].
67
Listing 4.4: Typical server anwser
1 HTTP/1.0 200 OK
2 Content−Type : t e x t /pla in
3 Server : Petname−C o n t r o l l e r /0.5 b
4 Content−Length : 2
5
6 OK
Computer
OPAD
Interface
Other
apps.
Logon
services
Web
browser
Device
drivers
Service
server
Figure 4.8: Communication with the OffPAD through a computer specific
HTTP-server.
computer’s device drivers to the OffPAD as shown in Figure 4.8. It would
even be possible to send the information over the internet, but then it has
to be encrypted and signed to keep the privacy for the user and integrity of
the data.
4.5.5 Google Chrome extension
The web browser extension for Google Chrome is based upon the function-
ality for extensions to block requests to servers. It is mostly used to block
advertisements or to block sites with child protection software. The exten-
sion registers a listener function with the chrome.webRequest.onBeforeRequest
handler [31]. Then Chrome will run the function before any request is
sent from the browser, and lets the function decide if the request should
be stopped or continue.
To limit the number of requests to the Petname-server the extension
only checks POST-requests, e.g. login or credit card details, as one web
page can issue tens or hundreds of GET-requests. But even with this
limitation some websites use POST-requests in scripts that updates parts
of a page or to send data about statistics. Such requests will be sent to the
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Petname System and might require some user interaction.
When a user sends a POST-request to a site, the extension sends a GET
request to the Petname-server like in listing 4.3 on page 67. If the server
returns "OK", the POST-request proceed. If it returns "BLOCK", the request
is stopped and a message is shown to the user.
4.5.6 Encountered challenges
The challenges encountered in this project was related to the TazCard
device.
Backlight problem
In the development of this Petname System we needed to draw the users
attention. We tried to get the screen backlight to blink, after it was reduced
to zero we could not get it back up to full intensity. It got up to about half
intensity. We contacted TazTag support to help us, but they did not find
any solution.
As there was other students working on the same device, we were able
to borrow a TazCard to do the tests.
Screen locks
Another problem on the TazCard was that the screen stopped responding.
After a great amount of debugging the code and rewriting some of the
user interface, we found the reason for the fault. The operating system lost
contact with the touch sensor on the screen. It is not an error that occurs
regularly, so it is hard to find any common denominator.
The way to fix this when it happens is to force a shut down on the
device and start it up again. There are some possibilities for the error to
still be present after the restart, if so we had to try again.
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Chapter 5
User Test
In this chapter we will describe the design and set up of the user test, as well
as the result from the test and interviews. Since the type of study impacts
every other part of the study, it is one of the first things to be discussed.
We continue with the selection of the participants, before the plan and
environment of the user tests and interviews. In Section 5.2 on page 76
we present, discuss and analyse the results from the test and interviews.
5.1 Design of the Study
It is important to plan the test and interviews as these can be difficult to
get right. There is a number of factors to consider. Such as what kind of
study we should perform, how many participants is required and how to
select these. The questions asked during the interview need to be carefully
formulated to not miss important points nor influence the participants own
opinions.
5.1.1 Goal of the study
The test should discover if a Petname System on an external device is
something users would use. It should also indicate what people think
about phishing attacks with or without a Petname System.
5.1.2 Type of study
Our study can be done as both a qualitative and a quantitative study.
Both have their advantages and disadvantages. A qualitative study gives
insight, but is hard to analyse. A quantitative study gives statistics and
several subjects can answer at the same time. However it can often be taken
out of context and it is easy to draw the wrong conclusions.
There are several elements that points to a qualitative study. Some of
these are of a practical nature, e.g. we have to use one special computer and
a special connected device. It removes the possibility to do several tests at
the same time. The most important reason to do a qualitative study is that
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it is more valuable for us to get insight into what a subject is thinking than
some statistics.
In qualitative study, there is a wide range of different types of
methodologies [65], e.g. Conversation analysis, Analytic Induction,
Discourse Analysis. We will do a simple case study combined with a
usability test, where the user is observed while using the system and
interviewed afterwards.
Before we can do a test or interviews where an element of the
information we receive can be linked back to the subject, we need to
get the permission from the Data Protection Official for Research. They
are assigned to ensure the privacy of individual persons participating in
research studies. In this case it is possible to identify a person from the
audio recording of their voice. The form sent to the Data Protection Official
for Research is available in Appendix E on page 111. We got the approval in
just one week, much faster than expected. The letter of approval is included
in Appendix F on page 117.
5.1.3 Selection of participants
Nielsen [60] states that a usability tests only needs five subjects. While there
is no agreed number of subjects in a qualitative study, experts conclude
with "it depends" [9]. Some of the factors to consider are the depth of the
interview, what we want to get out of the study and which people are going
to be interviewed. None of them are easy to place a number on. There are
also some more tangible factors to take into account, like resources and
time.
When trying to choose the number of participants, the first factor we
considered was the type of people that were required. The target for an
external Petname System is a security minded person that uses services
on the internet on a daily basis. Then we had to find what we wanted to
answer, to see if it would help us settle the number of participants. The
main question is simple "Would you use an external Petname System?". As
we already know this system could be used and do work, the purpose is to
find out if users would use it.
We decided that six participants would be sufficient. It would be more
than the required number of five for the user test. The number of answers
would also be sufficient to get most of the different opinions about the
Petname System presented, as the scope of the questions is limited.
The participants in this test and following interviews are mainly fellow
students. Some of them are aware of the topic of our project. However none
had any knowledge about the questions or nature of the test. We chose to
include two persons that did not have informatics as their field of study, to
see if they would have other opinions than the rest.
There is a possibility that their knowledge of the topic might have made
them more cautious to the exercises they are going to perform. It might be
the same case if the selection of participants is completely random, since
the idea of the Petname System and how it works has to be explained to
the subject in front of the test anyway.
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5.1.4 Questions
The set of questions can be placed into three categories or subsets:
• Describe what has been done.
• Evaluation and thoughts of the system.
• Awareness of phishing attacks.
The first subset is both to check if the subject has understood what he
or she tested and to see if the Petname System was easy to use. The second
subset of questions is to get the subject’s feelings and thoughts around their
use of the Petname System. The last subset is just to find out in what degree
the subject is aware of possible phishing attacks.
We used the name OffPAD in the questions to refer to the device on the
table, and Petname System when addressing the service it provided. The
questions for our interviews was as follows:
• While not using the OffPAD
– Did all web sites work normally?
– If you noticed anything unusual, what was it?
• While using the OffPAD
– Did all web sites work normally?
– If you noticed anything unusual, what was it?
– Would you have noticed the phishing site without the OffPAD?
– If you think everything was normal, why did you not notice the
warning on the OffPAD?
• General questions to the experiment
– How did your vigilance change after identifying the first
phishing page?
– How did your sense of security change when using the OffPAD?
– Were you more or less aware during the experiment then usual?
– How do you think the use of an OffPAD will impact your daily
internet use?
• What would you think about using the Petname System...
– if it was on your smart-phone?
– if it was a separate device?
– if it was on a multi purpose authentication device?
• Normally when accessing and logging on to websites, how aware of
phishing attacks are you?
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• How do you consider the possibility for phishing attacks against your
person?
• What do you think about the usability of the OffPAD prototype?
• Is there something else you want to add?
5.1.5 Interview guide
We developed an interview guide for the tests and interviews. Our guide
is based on Pathfinder International’s guide to designing and conducting
interviews [10]. The whole interview guide is available in Norwegian in
Appendix D on page 107. A short summary with comments will follow.
The first part is an introduction to this test and interview. Where the
subject is informed that the interview is going to be audio recorded. The
recording is confidential and the published results will not identify the
subject. The subject is also informed that he or she is not obliged to answer
any question and can terminate the interview at any moment in time. It is
important to respect the person that has given of their time to help you.
The subject gets a short introduction to the Petname System available to
them. Then the subject gets four obfuscated links and is asked to enter each
of them, log on with a given user name and password and add a Petname
for each of them. The user name and password do not have an account so
the subject is informed that a "wrong user name and password" message is
to be expected. A valid user is not a requirement for the Petname System
to work.
Exercise 1
The subject gets four links in random order to each of the sites, where one
of them is to a fake site. Then they are asked to log on to each of these, with
the Petname System connected.
Exercise 2
The subject gets a new list of four links in random order, where one is to
a fake site. It is not the same fake site as in exercise one. The change from
exercise one is that the Petname System is deactivated.
After they are finished with these exercises, they will be interviewed
about their experience with the question listed in Section 5.1.4 on the
previous page. The interview session concludes with an opportunity for
the subject to add any last comments or remarks.
The participants are divided into two groups; group A (the first half)
and B (the second half). Group A will do exercise one first and then exercise
two. While group B will do it in the opposite order.
5.1.6 Phishing sites
There were made four phishing sites just for the use in this test. To keep
this simple, the subjects were asked to log in with a non existing user, as
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Real domain Fake domain
nb-no.facebook.com nb-no.facebook.ccm
accounts.google.com accounts.google.ccm
www.linkedin.com www.linkedin.ccm
twitter.com twitter.ccm
Table 5.1: Used domain names for real and fake sites.
that is enough to trigger the Petname System. There are two reasons for
this. The first is that subjects would know the user names and passwords
afterwards so we would have to change them all after every interview.
The other reason is that it is easier to make a page that says "wrong user
name or password" than to make a page that mimic the content served on
the real site. We also did not want the users to enter their own user names
and passwords. As it could make the subjects unwilling to participate as
they do not have any control over where the data was going.
The phishing sites were composed of a login-page and a "Login failed"-
page. The login-page is the same as the landing page for each of the domain
names for the sites in question. Only Gmail used the same page for both
the login and account refused. Screenshots of the original and the phishing
site can be found in Appendix C on page 101.
All the sites used had a .com domain name. It was changed to .ccm
(the letter o is replaced with the letter c) for the fake sites. See Table 5.1
for each of the used domain names. As it is not possible to register .ccm
domain names, the domains used in this test was added to the host-file
in windows. The host-file is checked for a domain name to IP-address
link before windows asks the networks DNS-servers. These domain names
pointed to a web server controlled by us.
All the real sites used SSL, our fake pages did not. It was considered if
we should add SSL certificates for the fake sites, by making a self signed
CA certificate and add it to the web browser. We concluded that it was not
necessary, as well as it would be interesting to se if anyone reacted on the
lack of SSL.
Under the making of these sites the browser we were using, Google
Chrome, reported the fake Facebook site as a phishing site. It is hard to
say how Chrome did this. We suspect that one of the images in the page
was still pointing back to facebook.com, which resulted in that Google
Chrome marked this as suspicious. Most of the sites we made copies of
had JavaScript to check if the domain name was the correct and redirect if
not. So all the images were saved locally and JavaScripts removed.
We made a change to the web server and the Chrome extension so that
only the web browser with this extension got access our phishing sites.
The extension was only installed on the computer used for the user tests.
It was to ensure no one, including Google, could suspect these sites where
real phishing sites. If the server was flagged as a phishing server it would
make it impossible for us to use Google Chrome.
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5.2 Results
The interviews were done between the 9th and 13th of March 2013, with a
total of six participants. As the number of participants are low, the statistics
from the test is not representative for any group of people. However their
opinions and feedback about the system is still valid. In some cases the
number of subjects taking one or the other stand will be mentioned. As it
shows if the opinion was a single point of view or if it was more common.
All the recordings from the interviews was deleted as soon they were
transcribed and all identifying elements in the transcription removed. The
last interview was deleted on the evening of the 13th of March. It is in
compliance of the requirements set by the Data Protection Official for Research
as described in their reply in Appendix F on page 117.
We are not trained interviewers, which might have affected how
some of the questions have been asked. These questions can have been
formulated in a way that could have lead the subject in their opinion. One
example of this is "How did your sense of security increase when using the
OffPAD?" where the word "increase" should be "change".
5.2.1 Observations
During the user test it was clear that the system itself was user-friendly.
None of the participants had any usability problems with the device. Two
encountered the problem mentioned in Section 4.5.6 on page 69 where the
screen locks. We had to restart the device to continue the test.
Out of the six persons we interviewed only two did actually check the
URL and discovered both the phishing sites before they used the user name
and password. There was also one of the participants who saw some error
in a graphical element, but when the participant checked the domain name,
he or she did not notice the change.
None of the participants reacted to the missing SSL indicator in the web
browser. All the real pages used SSL and all the fake ones did not, by
observing this a vigilant person is able to circle out the phishing sites. It is
as expected when taking into account what we discussed in Section 2.2.4
on page 23 about people not noticing security indicators.
In group B, where they used the Petname System first, all the subjects
were more vigilant to possible attacks than the participants in group A. It
could be argued that this was against the Hawthorne Effect [54], where a
subject is more alert or efficient because they know they are being observed.
The set up of this experiment would lead to users being more careful after
their discovered the first phishing attack. The test is also too small and
simple to say anything about the workings of the Hawthorne Effect.
5.2.2 Findings
The interviewees came with a number of ideas and thoughts under the
test about the Petname System, the OffPAD and phishing in general.
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We will now go through the points from the interviews and discuss the
interviewees comments and feedback.
As mentioned earlier we used the name OffPAD for the device on
the table and Petname System for the application. It resulted in that the
subjects mostly used the word OffPAD for both. It is of no inconvenience
as in this test and interview it is the same thing.
Test without the OffPAD
Four of the subjects noticed a phishing site. The only one in group A said
that he or she always checked the URL. In group B two of the subjects
found the phishing site because they expected to find one. Both claim in
the interview they noticed something they considered to be abnormal, but
in fact were completely correct. The first person thought the URL was too
long even if it was exactly the same length as the original, the other read
fakebook instead of facebook.
The last person in group B noticed the phishing site without the OffPAD
right away. He or she did also pinpoint the phishing site before trying to
log into it in the exercise with the OffPAD.
Test with the OffPAD
Every subject reacted on the alert message from the OffPAD when they
entered their user name and password into the phishing site. One let the
request continue even if he or she noticed the difference in the domain
names. When asked why this was done, we got the answer "it was just
to see what happened". This illustrates the problem of invoking the curiosity
of internet users; they will click.
How vigilance changed
Most of the subjects reported a higher vigilance after the first phishing site
was found. Two said that they did not get more vigilant, as they were
always vigilant when using the Internet. It was the same subjects that
found the phishing site before the OffPAD gave any indication.
As this is a constructed environment and actions, which makes the
subject suspicious and likely to expect another phishing attack after
the first. How long this heightened vigilance would last in a normal
environment is hard to say. We suspect the vigilance would decrease to
a normal level in a couple of hours after a failed attack.
Sense of security with the OffPAD
The change in the sense of security between with and without the OffPAD
varied from equal to a heighten sense with the OffPAD. Those who had
an equal sense of security said it did not add much to what they already
did themselves. Or the subjects had certain habits when it came to what
websites they usually visits and rarely deviated from these.
77
The subjects who felt safer described the OffPAD as an extra precaution
when surfing the internet.
Impact on daily internet use
None of the subjects mentioned any direct negative implications by using
an OffPAD. Most did not think this system would change their behaviour.
Here they reiterated the use of web browser bookmarks and writing the
address themselves as a reason.
It was also mentioned that the Google search engine was used to find
websites on the internet. Google is very efficient to remove suspected
phishing and malware sites. They also give the most popular results first,
which usually is the correct site.
One of the important points mentioned by one of the subjects was that
a Petname System might make him or her indirectly more reckless on
the internet. It enlightens a flaw in the implementation. In the way this
Petname System is implemented (e.g. not responding to GET-requests) it
can give a false sense of security, making them an easier target for phishing
attacks.
Devices to use
All the subjects had a negative attitude to a device like the TazCard that
only supplied a Petname System. One of the subject would probably use
a solution like this for important sites like the Bank and e-Government if
it was available, but not for web mail and social networks. Two subjects
mentioned that they would have considered it if it was in the size of a key
chain. A fourth subject pointed out "Who would pay for this junk?". It is a
fair question as such a device might be just as expensive as a simple smart
phone.
Most of the participants were positive to a multi purpose authentication
device, as this could limit the number of required devices to one. One
participant had a different approach to this; he or she said they would be
more sceptical to a device with all of their credentials. "If it got lost you
get more problems", referring to if someone takes the device and manages
to unlock, it they can access every service a user is using. It shows the
importance to have a good and simple revocation system in place, which
the users have confidence in.
The most preferable solution for all the participants was to use their
mobile phone in one way or another. One added "If it goes seamlessly. Can
use some time in the beginning to set it up. (...) As long as you do not need to
do any action if the site is already known". It shows that a Petname System
would be used if it is does not require much user interaction when pages is
known and everything is normal.
All the subjects wanted the device to be wireless and not connected with
a cable as the TazCard was in this experiment. It should not be necessary
to take it out of the pocket or backpack, when it was going to be used.
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The threat of phishing
The answers from the participants regarding their awareness to phishing
attacks showed that this was not high on their agenda. Most of them did
not care or did not believe it would happen to them. The reason was
that they mostly used their own bookmarks or typed the domain name
themselves when logging in to a site.
There was one exception, where phishing was regarded as a big threat.
"You can loose much if you get phished". This person also mentioned indirectly
to have been a target for a phishing attack. It was easy to see that this
person was more aware, because he or she discovered all the phishing sites
before the Petname System could react.
They all considered that the possibility to be a directly targeted in a
spear phishing attack as very unlikely.
Usability of the prototype
All the participants had a positive impression of the prototype. The
feedback ranged from "It’s all right" to "Surprisingly good". Size was also
mentioned here, it has to be smaller. It also got positive remarks on its
response time.
A participant pointed out "It was intuitive and easy to use (...) for me it
was no problems, but if you are not a technical person it might be a bit hard".
It did not seem to cause any problems for the two non-technical persons
participating in this study.
Summary
The key findings from this test and related interviews can be summarised
as the following:
• A Petname System can help to discover phishing sites.
• The Petname System did indirectly teach the users what to look for.
• The device used should either be a mobile phone or a small device.
• The user must be aware of the limitations of the Petname System.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
We have in this thesis discussed different methods and technologies that
can help to ensure the user’s security on the Internet. In the course of this
thesis we have answered our research questions from Section 1.4 on page 3.
We have described the challenges of cognitive entity authentication
on the internet today, as well as describing a system that protects users
from giving away their personal information to unknown and potentially
malicious websites. The external Petname System has been developed,
tested and evaluated as planned.
6.1 Cognitive Service Authentication
There is absolutely a need for a user to be able to perform cognitive entity
authentication of service providers. Because more of the technical client-to-
service solutions available can be mimicked or even bought by the attacker
in a legal way (e.g. SSL certificates). There is also a problem of user
awareness about security limitations in systems widely available today. It
could be introduced as a system to help users in their assessment of security
factors, both as a mean to educate and to secure users.
When the management and operation of a system is placed on the users
side, it gets hard for a man-in-the-middle to be able to fool the system with
a proxy solution. For same reason such a system will also be superior to
most of the solutions of user personalisation described in Section 2.2.4 on
page 21.
The Petname System is a proven and working concept. If available, it
will help a user to ensure stronger security. As the system focuses on the
domain name it might be interesting to combine this with DNSSEC, which
uses cryptological functionality to validate the DNS integrity.
Certificates will still be used to ensure a secure channel between the
service and the client. It cannot be expected of a user to actually open the
certificate to check if it is valid, the mental load will be too high. Just the
process for a user to check if the SSL-indicator is present and remember this
to the next time he or she accesses the same site, gives a too high mental
load for the user. Which can be a part of the explanation for the number of
people not noticing the SSL-indicator.
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6.2 External Petname System
The External Petname System developed as a part of this thesis, extends
other Petname Systems by also checking if an URL is similar to an already
known Petname. When evaluating this system against the requirements
from [22], it did not come out as good as we would have liked. The reason
is that the requirements are made with an in-browser system in mind and
not an external system, which is a different environment to handle.
There are some limitations to the developed Petname System. The most
important is when it should do the checks, not to overload the user with
new Petname requests, and at the same time letting the user add Petnames
for the important sites. The ideal case would be to do the check when
the user is giving away personal information and ignore when the user
just surf the online news services. It is hard to do automatically since it is
almost impossible to determine one from the other. Another limitation is
that it only supports one kind of web browser and connection only over
USB. It should be possible to extend the system to Mozilla Firefox at least.
Alternative communication interfaces should be quite simple to develop.
It has to be as generic as possible to allow for different kinds of usage.
We used the TazCard for our prototype, which is a cleverly made
device. It could have been a perfect solution for an OffPAD. However
as the production is stopped we are waiting for other devices that can
satisfy the requirements. Although if there is no clear OffPAD solution
readily available at the moment, the Petname System can be implemented
on smart phones or similar devices. TazTag is currently considering new
designs of OffPAD devices in an extension of the Lucidman project where
the University of Oslo is a partner.
6.3 User tests
The test subjects were positive to a Petname System and would have used
it if it was available. They do not want a new device, they wanted the
Petname System in their mobile phone or in a device that would replace
another device they already carry. For instance the OTP-calculators from
banks. It has to be as small as possible. The size of a keyring was mentioned
as optimal.
There was also a question about who should pay for such devices. It
depends on who requires the services a device like this can provide. For
instance a bank, an employer, an institution or the user themselves. It is
important that the cost is as low as possible, to be able to get it into the
marked.
82
Chapter 7
Future work
There is a large number of ways to develop this idea and to use it in
different solutions. We will now describe some projects that could follow
up on the work done in this theses.
7.1 The Missing Link - User Patterns
More and more websites use third party authentication. One example of
this is the student portal (StudentWeb) at the University of Oslo. When
you want to log in you get forwarded to a common authenticator (FEIDE).
After authentication you get sent back to StudentWeb.
If the Petname Model could be extended to check how the user
navigates on the web. It could prevent cross-side-scripting and other
malicious code injected on a website. The system can be built up as a graph,
giving every web page one node and weight the edge with the number of
times the user moves from one page to another. A strong path from the start
node to the end node can be regarded as securely unique. Any deviation
from the path might be an indication of an attack.
As information only will be saved in the user’s own device the privacy
preserved.
The biggest challenge in such a system is the amount of data to process
and the computing power needed. Both the constructing of the paths and
the validation of these has to be done live. The system has to be secure as
it will contain much personal information.
7.2 Sign Requests
Data sent between the browser extension and the OffPAD needs to be
signed in a way that can be validated on both sides. As the browser is
regarded as insecure and there might be a man-in-the-middle between the
device driver and the browser extension. It could be done in a similar way
as shown in Figure 3.3 on page 50, or by using a kind of service certificate
organised in a Public Key Infrastructure.
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Such a solution might also include encryption of the data, which would
be required if the packet left the computer over an insecure connection, e.g.
WLAN and ZigBee.
7.3 Web Browser Extension 2.0
There is a need to make a more intelligent web browser extension. The
one made in this project is a simple and rudimentary solution. There is a
number of different enhancements that can be done.
• Show in the browser that the user’s attention is required on the
OffPAD.
• Make support to show images and text from the OffPAD in the
browser.
• Let the user pair the browser extension and the OffPAD with a
asymmetric key, to ensure privacy and integrity.
• Make a settings page where the user could change the settings for the
extension.
• Give the user the opportunity to take and restore a backup of their
Petnames through the extension.
7.4 When To Check
One challenge with using a Petname System is when the system should
check the database. Opening one of the major news sites in Norway
generates over 400 requests. These are requests for pictures, scripts, style
sheets and data. These requests are also directed to numerous domain
names. If every request was going to be validated by the Petname System
the user would have to add tens of Petnames for each site he visits. It is not
hard to imagine the user giving up the system in a heart beat.
To combine this with other solutions for user authentication, e.g.
external http-digest, it would be a quite small number of requests that
would pass through the Petname System.
7.5 Real Life Long Therm User Test
To get a better understanding of how a Petname System would work in
daily life, it is necessary to see what people thought about the system after
using it for a longer period of time. For instance two or three weeks. After
this test period evaluate the usage and the users feelings for this kind of
system.
It can with advantage be done simultaneously with other security
applications, e.g. validating of DNSSEC and external http-digest.
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7.6 Life Cycle
There is a need to define the life cycle for an OffPAD. It should at least cover
the following points.
• Register
What has to be done when buying a new device. E.g. generating
certificates and register to services.
• Operate
Every day use.
• Backup
How a backup should be taken.
• Restore
How to restore a backup either to current or a new device.
• Loss
What to do if the device is lost.
• Terminate
What has to be done when a device is taken out of service.
It should also contain a plan on how the device can be replaced
immediately in the case it is lost or stops working. This includes a
revocation of all earlier credentials and the issuing of new credentials for
the new device. All applications made for this platform should follow the
same life cycle.
7.7 Make a Communication Interface Service
The OffPAD can use several communication interfaces, at the same time
the interfaces available on the computer is limited and a browser plug-in
could probably only use one.
It requires a service running on a computer that can communicate with
the OffPAD. It should be able to do this over different communication
interfaces available on the computer, as there is no standardised interface to
the OffPAD. The service should also give a single interface for applications
on the computer to connect to.
How this communication is done should be standardised and generic to
allow multiple computer applications to access multiple devices with their
set of services.
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Appendix A
Acronyms
AJAX Asynchronous JavaScript and XML.
APWG Anti-Phishing Working Group.
BankID Norwegian On-line banking identification.
CA Certificate Authority.
CDN Content Delivery Network.
CRL Certificate Revocation Lists.
CSAADF Child Sexual Abuse Anti Distribution Filter.
DANE DNS-based Authentication of Named Entities.
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service.
DNS Domain Name System.
DNSKEY Domain Name System Key.
DNSSEC Domain Name System SECurity Extensions.
DoS Denial of Service.
DS Delegation Signer.
HART Highway Addressable Remote Transducer.
HTTPS Hyper Text Transfer Protocol over Secure Sockets Layer.
IANA Internet Assigned Numbers Authority.
ISP Internet Service Provider.
KSK Key Signing Key.
LUCIDMAN Local User Centric ID Management.
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MTC Mobile Threat Center.
NFC Near Field Communication.
NIDS Remote Network Driver Interface Specification.
NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology.
OffPAD Off Personal Authentication Device.
OSI Open Systems Interconnection.
OTP One Time Password.
PAD Personal Authentication Device.
PIN Personal Identification Number.
PKIX X.509 Public-Key Infrastructure.
RFID Radio-Frequency Identification.
RR Resource Record.
RRSIG Resource Record Signature.
SSL Secure Sockets Layer.
TOFU Trust-On-First-Use.
URI Uniform Resource Identifier.
URL Uniform Resource Locator.
USB Universal Serial Bus.
XSS Cross-Side-Scripting.
ZSK Zone Signing Key.
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Appendix B
Requirements To Petname
Systems
There we have listed the different requirements and properties related to a
Petname System.
F1. A Petname System must consist of at least a Pointer and a Petname.
F2. Nickname is optional.
F3. Pointers must be strongly resistant against forgery so that the
Pointer can not be used to identify a false entity.
F4. For every user there must be a bi-directional one-to-one mapping
between the Pointer and the Petname of each entity.
Table B.1: Functional Properties [22]
F4. For every user there must be a bi-directional one-to-many mapping
between the Petname and the Pointer of each entity only if these
pointers refer to the same entity, otherwise a bidirectional oneto-
one mapping between the Petname and Pointer of each entity has
to be enforced. That is, the same Petname can be used for different
pointers only if all these pointers refer to the same entity.
Table B.2: New Functional Property [23]
A1. Users must understand which security actions are required of
them.
A2. Users must have sufficient knowledge and the ability to take the
correct security action.
A3. The mental and physical load of a security action must be tolerable.
A4. The mental and physical load of making repeated security actions
for any practical number of instances must be tolerable.
Table B.3: Security Action Usability Principles [44]
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SA1. It is the user who must assign the Petname for each Pointer.
SA2. Users must assign the Petname for the Pointer with explicit
action.
SA3. As the relationship between the user and other entities evolve,
the user should be able to edit the previously applied Petname
for a Pointer to a new Petname.
SA4. Suggestion on the Petname based on the Nickname can be
provided as an aid for the user to select a Petname for a Pointer.
If the Nickname is missing, other criteria could be chosen for the
suggestion.
SA5. If a suggestion is provided and the user wants to accept it as the
Petname, then he must do so with explicit action.
SA6. Petname Systems must make sure that the user-selected, created
or suggested Petname is sufficiently distinct from the Nickname
so that the user does not confuse them with each other.
SA7. Petname Systems must make sure that the user-selected, created
or suggested Petname must be sufficiently different from existing
Petnames so that the user does not confuse them. This is needed
to reduce the risk of mimicry of the Petname upon which the
security of the Petname System largely depends.
SA8. If the user chooses a Petname that may resemble a Nickname or
other Petnames, he should be warned explicitly.
SA9. The User should be alerted to apply a Petname for the entity that
involves in highly sensitive data transmission.
SC1. The Pointer and the corresponding Petname must be displayed at
all times through the user interface of the Petname System. This
will make the user confident about his interaction and help to
draw the security conclusion easily.
SC2. The Petname for a Pointer should be displayed with enough
clarity at the user interface so that it can attract the user’s
attention easily.
SC3. The absence of a Petname for a Pointer should be clearly and
visually indicated at the user interface so that the user is surely
informed about its absence.
SC4. The visual indication for suggested Petnames and Nicknames
should be unambiguous enough so that the user does not confuse
them with each other.
SC5. The warning message that will be provided when there is a direct
violation of any of the above properties should be clear enough so
that the user can understand the problem and take the necessary
security action.
Table B.4: Security Usability Properties [22]
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C1. Users must understand the security conclusion that is required for
making an informed decision.
C2. The system must provide the user with sufficient information for
deriving the security conclusion.
C3. The mental load of deriving the security conclusion must be
tolerable.
C4. The mental load of deriving security conclusions for any practical
number of instances must be tolerable.
Table B.5: Security Conclusion Usability Principles [44]
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Appendix C
Phishing Sites Compared With
The Original
The following screen shoots of web sites on the next pages. The fake sites
had only one function; ask for user name and password and return invalid
password. They were also as like as possible to the original. The work done
is nothing more then what any attacker could replicate.
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C.1 Facebook
Figure C.1: Real Facebook site
Figure C.2: Fake Facebook site
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C.2 Gmail
Figure C.3: Real Google site
Figure C.4: Fake Google site
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C.3 Linkedin
Figure C.5: Real Linkedin site
Figure C.6: Fake Linkedin site
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C.4 Twitter
Figure C.7: Real Twitter site
Figure C.8: Fake Twitter site
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Appendix D
Interview Guide
The guide on the following paged is the one used in the interviews.
The first page is an introduction to the interview with a place for the
interviewee to give the informed consent. It is also read aloud by the
interviewer. The second page is a description of the test, and the last is
the questions for to use for the interviewer. it is translated into English in
section 5.1.4. Some of the questions depend on how the interviewee do the
user test. The guide is explained in section 5.1.5.
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Petname test og undersøkelse
Tusen takk for at du har sagt deg villig til å delta i denne undersøkelsen. Mitt navn er Kent 
Varmedal og ønsker nå å la deg få teste ut en teknisk løsning for å forhindre at personlig 
informasjon kommer på avveie, samt evaluere den og snakke litt om phishing angrep. 
Denne undersøkelsen skal ikke ta mer enn 20 minutter. Sesjonen vil bli tatt opp siden jeg ikke 
ønsker å gå glipp av noen av din kommentarer. Selv om jeg vil gjøre notater underveis, er jeg ikke 
på langt nær rask nok til å skrive alt. Så pass på å snakk høyt og tydelig.
Alle innspill vil bli behandlet konfidensielt. Det vil i praksis si at det er kun jeg som vil behandle 
informasjonen, og den informasjonen som blir brukt i master-oppgaven vil ikke kunne brukes til å 
identifisere noen av deltakerne i undersøkelsen.
Husk du trenger ikke å svare om du ikke ønsker og kan avslutte undersøkelsen når som helst.
Har du noen spørsmål angående det jeg nettopp har fortalt?
Er du villig til å delta i dette intervjuet?
__________________ ____________________________________
Dato Navn
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Test
Nå skal du få teste en teknisk løsning for å forhindre at falske nettsider stjeler personlig 
informasjon. Du skal logge inn på fire kjente nettsteder med et brukernavn og passord oppgitt til 
deg. Denne brukeren eksisterer ikke, men prosessen vil være tilstrekkelig for å få testet systemet. 
Du vil i tre runder få utlevert fire nettadresser. Disse adressene skal aksesseres i den oppgitte 
rekkefølgen, og er maskert for å hindre nysgjerrighet. Du vil bli observert mens du utfører disse.
Enheten koblet til datamaskinen er et eksternt Petname system. Det gir deg muligheten til å legge 
inn kallenavn for den siden du skal logge deg inn på. Et eksempel kan være «min bank» når man 
logger inn på «www.dnb.no»
I første runde skal du legge inn nye kallenavn for hver av sidene du får linker til. Trykk på linken og 
logg inn med det oppgitte brukernavnet og passordet. Legg inn nytt kallenavn for siden på enheten 
når du blir spurt om det.
Gjør det samme med de tre andre linkene.
I andre runde skal du logge inn på sidene på nytt med nye linker uten å bruke petname systemet. 
I tredje og siste runde skal du logge inn på sidene, men nå med petname systemet tilkoblet.
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Spørsmål til intervjuet
I runden uten OffPAD  
– Virket alt normalt da du gikk til websidene?
– Hvis du merket noe unormalt, hva var det? 
I runden med OffPAD
– Virket alt normalt da du gikk til websidene?
– Hvis du merket noe unormalt, hva var det? 
– Ville du ha oppdaget phishing nettsiden uten OffPAD?
– Hvis du syntes alt var normalt, hvorfor la du ikke merke til advarselen fra OffPAD?
Generelle spørsmål rundt eksperimentet
– Hvordan ble din årvåkenhet endret etter å ha oppdaget en phishing side?
– Hvordan ble din følelse av sikkerhet endret når du benyttet OffPAD?
– Var du mer eller mindre oppmerksom under eksperimentet enn det du vanligvis er?
– Hvordan tror du bruk av OffPAD kan påvirke din daglige bruk av Internett?
Hvordan syns du det ville være å benytte OffPAD 
Hvis den var integrert i smart-telefon? 
Hvis den var en egen separat dings for petname autentisering? 
Hvis den var en egen separat dings med flere sikkerhetsfunksjoner?  
Normalt når du går til websider med innlogging, hvor oppmerksom er du på phishing angrep?
Hvordan vurderer du phishing som en trussel mot deg selv?
Hvordan synes du OffPAD prototypen var å bruke?
Er det noe annet du ønsker å legge til?
Jeg vil nå analysere de svarene du og andre har gitt meg, resultatet vil bli lagt frem i min master-
oppgave.
Tusen takk for at du stilte opp.
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Appendix E
Notification Form from Data
Protection Official for Research
On the following pages you will find the filled out Notification Form from
Data Protection Official for Research. It must be approved before the data
gathering from the test is allowed to be done.
It is in Norwegain because it is required to be in Norwegian if the
applicant is.
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MELDESKJEMA
Meldeskjema (versjon 1.4) for forsknings- og studentprosjekt som medfører meldeplikt eller konsesjonsplikt
(jf. personopplysningsloven og helseregisterloven med forskrifter).
1. Prosjekttittel
Tittel Brukertest og undersøkelse av phishing
2. Behandlingsansvarlig institusjon
Institusjon Universitetet i Oslo Velg den institusjonen du er tilknyttet. Alle nivå må
oppgis. Ved studentprosjekt er det studentens
tilknytning som er avgjørende. Dersom institusjonen
ikke finnes på listen, vennligst ta kontakt med
personvernombudet.
Avdeling/Fakultet Det matematisk-naturvitenskapelige fakultet
Institutt Institutt for informatikk
3. Daglig ansvarlig (forsker, veileder, stipendiat)
Fornavn Audun Før opp navnet på den som har det daglige ansvaret
for prosjektet.Veileder er vanligvis daglig ansvarlig
ved studentprosjekt.
Veileder og student må være tilknyttet samme
institusjon. Dersom studenten har ekstern veileder,
kan biveileder eller fagansvarlig ved studiestedet stå
som daglig ansvarlig.Arbeidssted må være tilknyttet
behandlingsansvarlig institusjon, f.eks.
underavdeling, institutt etc.
NB! Det er viktig at du oppgir en e-postadresse som
brukes aktivt. Vennligst gi oss beskjed dersom den
endres.
Etternavn Jøssang
Akademisk grad Doktorgrad
Stilling Professor
Arbeidssted Institutt for Informatikk, Universitetet i Oslo
Adresse (arb.sted) Ole-Johan Dahls hus, Gaustadalléen 23b
Postnr/sted (arb.sted) 0373 Oslo
Telefon/mobil (arb.sted) 22845524 /
E-post josang@matnat.uio.no
4. Student (master, bachelor)
Studentprosjekt Ja ● Nei ○ NB! Det er viktig at du oppgir en e-postadresse som
brukes aktivt. Vennligst gi oss beskjed dersom den
endres.
Fornavn Kent Are
Etternavn Varmedal
Akademisk grad Lavere grad
Privatadresse Sinsenveien 5A
Postnr/sted (privatadresse) 0572 Oslo
Telefon/mobil 48002214 /
E-post kentav@ifi.uio.no
5. Formålet med prosjektet
Formål Formålet er å teste og vurdere ekstern enhet med et
"Petname System" for å forhindre phishing angrep på
Internett.
Redegjør kort for prosjektets formål, problemstilling,
forskningsspørsmål e.l.
Maks 750 tegn.
6. Prosjektomfang
Velg omfang ● Enkel institusjon
○ Nasjonalt samarbeidsprosjekt
○ Internasjonalt samarbeidsprosjekt
Med samarbeidsprosjekt menes prosjekt som
gjennomføres av flere institusjoner samtidig, som
har samme formål og hvor personopplysninger
utveksles.Oppgi øvrige institusjoner
Oppgi hvordan samarbeidet
foregår
7. Utvalgsbeskrivelse
Side 1
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Utvalget Studenter med generell sikkerhetsinteresse. Med utvalg menes dem som deltar i undersøkelsen
eller dem det innhentes opplysninger om. F.eks. et
representativt utvalg av befolkningen, skoleelever
med lese- og skrivevansker, pasienter, innsatte.
Rekruttering og trekking Frivillige studenter som blir oppfordret til å delta.
Studentene kan få høre om prosjektet på slutten av
en forelesing eller bli direkte spurt om de ønsker å
delta.
Beskriv hvordan utvalget trekkes eller rekrutteres og
oppgi hvem som foretar den. Et utvalg kan trekkes
fra registre som f.eks. Folkeregisteret, SSB-registre,
pasientregistre, eller det kan rekrutteres gjennom
f.eks. en bedrift, skole, idrettsmiljø, eget nettverk.
Førstegangskontakt Studenter kan melde sin egen interesse for å delta,
eller studenter kan bli spurt av Kent Varmedal om de
vil stille opp.
Beskriv hvordan førstegangskontakten opprettes og
oppgi hvem som foretar den.
Les mer om dette på temasidene Hva skal du forske
på?
Alder på utvalget □ Barn (0-15 år)
□ Ungdom (16-17 år)
■ Voksne (over 18 år)
Antall personer som inngår i
utvalget
6
Inkluderes det myndige
personer med redusert eller
manglende
samtykkekompetanse?
Ja ○ Nei ● Begrunn hvorfor det er nødvendig å inkludere
myndige personer med redusert eller manglende
samtykkekompetanse.
Les mer om Pasienter, brukere og personer med
redusert eller manglende samtykkekompetanse
Hvis ja, begrunn
8. Metode for innsamling av personopplysninger
Kryss av for hvilke
datainnsamlingsmetoder og
datakilder som vil benyttes
□ Spørreskjema
■ Personlig intervju
□ Gruppeintervju
■ Observasjon
□ Psykologiske/pedagogiske tester
□ Medisinske undersøkelser/tester
□ Journaldata
□ Registerdata
□ Annen innsamlingsmetode
Personopplysninger kan innhentes direkte fra den
registrerte f.eks. gjennom spørreskjema, intervju,
tester, og/eller ulike journaler (f.eks. elevmapper,
NAV, PPT, sykehus) og/eller registre (f.eks.
Statistisk sentralbyrå, sentrale helseregistre).
Annen innsamlingsmetode,
oppgi hvilken
Kommentar Først vil deltakeren få teste ut systemet, for å så bli
intervjuet med spørsmål til testen og phishing
generelt.
9. Datamaterialets innhold
Redegjør for hvilke
opplysninger som samles
inn
Det vil bli observert hvordan den tekniske enheten
blir benyttet, for å se etter brukermønster og hvor
eventuelle problemer oppstår. Det er utarbeidet en
intervjuguide for dette forsøket.
Spørreskjema, intervju-/temaguide,
observasjonsbeskrivelse m.m. sendes inn sammen
med meldeskjemaet.
NB! Vedleggene lastes opp til sist i meldeskjema, se
punkt 16 Vedlegg.
Samles det inn direkte
personidentifiserende
opplysninger?
Ja ○ Nei ● Dersom det krysses av for ja her, se nærmere under
punkt 11 Informasjonssikkerhet.
Les mer om hva personopplysninger er
NB! Selv om opplysningene er anonymiserte i
oppgave/rapport, må det krysses av dersom direkte
og/eller indirekte personidentifiserende opplysninger
innhentes/registreres i forbindelse med prosjektet.
Hvis ja, hvilke? □ 11-sifret fødselsnummer
□ Navn, fødselsdato, adresse, e-postadresse og/eller
telefonnummer
Spesifiser hvilke
Samles det inn indirekte
personidentifiserende
opplysninger?
Ja ○ Nei ● En person vil være indirekte identifiserbar dersom
det er mulig å identifisere vedkommende gjennom
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Hvis ja, hvilke? bakgrunnsopplysninger som for eksempel
bostedskommune eller arbeidsplass/skole kombinert
med opplysninger som alder, kjønn, yrke, diagnose,
etc.
Samles det inn sensitive
personopplysninger?
Ja ○ Nei ●
Hvis ja, hvilke? □ Rasemessig eller etnisk bakgrunn, eller politisk,
filosofisk eller religiøs oppfatning
□ At en person har vært mistenkt, siktet, tiltalt eller
dømt for en straffbar handling
□ Helseforhold
□ Seksuelle forhold
□ Medlemskap i fagforeninger
Samles det inn opplysninger
om tredjeperson?
Ja ○ Nei ● Med opplysninger om tredjeperson menes
opplysninger som kan spores tilbake til personer
som ikke inngår i utvalget. Eksempler på
tredjeperson er kollega, elev, klient, familiemedlem.
Hvis ja, hvem er
tredjeperson og hvilke
opplysninger registreres?
Hvordan informeres
tredjeperson om
behandlingen?
□ Skriftlig
□ Muntlig
□ Informeres ikke
Informeres ikke, begrunn
10. Informasjon og samtykke
Oppgi hvordan utvalget
informeres
□ Skriftlig
■ Muntlig
□ Informeres ikke
Vennligst send inn informasjonsskrivet eller mal for
muntlig informasjon sammen med meldeskjema.
NB! Vedlegg lastes opp til sist i meldeskjemaet, se
punkt 16 Vedlegg.
Dersom utvalget ikke skal informeres om
behandlingen av personopplysninger må det
begrunnes.
Les mer om krav til samtykke
Begrunn
Oppgi hvordan samtykke fra
utvalget innhentes
■ Skriftlig
■ Muntlig
□ Innhentes ikke
Dersom det innhentes skriftlig samtykke anbefales
det at samtykkeerklæringen utformes som en
svarslipp eller på eget ark. Dersom det ikke skal
innhentes samtykke, må det begrunnes.Innhentes ikke, begrunn
11. Informasjonssikkerhet
Direkte
personidentifiserende
opplysninger erstattes med
et referansenummer som
viser til en atskilt navneliste
(koblingsnøkkel)
Ja ○ Nei ● Har du krysset av for ja under punkt 9
Datamaterialets innhold må det merkes av for
hvordan direkte personidentifiserende opplysninger
registreres.
NB! Som hovedregel bør ikke direkte
personidentifiserende opplysninger registreres
sammen med det øvrige datamaterialet.
Hvordan oppbevares
navnelisten/
koblingsnøkkelen og hvem
har tilgang til den?
Direkte
personidentifiserende
opplysninger oppbevares
sammen med det øvrige
materialet
Ja ○ Nei ●
Hvorfor oppbevares direkte
personidentifiserende
opplysninger sammen med
det øvrige datamaterialet?
Oppbevares direkte
personidentifiserbare
opplysninger på andre
måter?
Ja ○ Nei ●
Spesifiser
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Hvordan registreres og
oppbevares datamaterialet?
□ Fysisk isolert datamaskin tilhørende virksomheten
□ Datamaskin i nettverkssystem tilhørende
virksomheten
□ Datamaskin i nettverkssystem tilknyttet Internett
tilhørende virksomheten
□ Fysisk isolert privat datamaskin
■ Privat datamaskin tilknyttet Internett
□ Videoopptak/fotografi
■ Lydopptak
■ Notater/papir
□ Annen registreringsmetode
Merk av for hvilke hjelpemidler som benyttes for
registrering og analyse av opplysninger.
Sett flere kryss dersom opplysningene registreres
på flere måter.
Annen registreringsmetode
beskriv
Behandles lyd-/videoopptak
og/eller fotografi ved hjelp
av datamaskinbasert utstyr?
Ja ● Nei ○ Kryss av for ja dersom opptak eller foto behandles
som lyd-/bildefil.
Les mer om behandling av lyd og bilde.
Hvordan er datamaterialet
beskyttet mot at
uvedkommende får innsyn?
Datamaterialet blir liggende på en bærbar PC med
brukernavn og passord. Datamatrialet på PCen vil bli
lagret i en kryptert pakket fil.
Er f.eks. datamaskintilgangen beskyttet med
brukernavn og passord, står datamaskinen i et
låsbart rom, og hvordan sikres bærbare enheter,
utskrifter og opptak?
Dersom det benyttes mobile
lagringsenheter (bærbar
datamaskin, minnepenn,
minnekort, cd, ekstern
harddisk, mobiltelefon),
oppgi hvilke
Selve opptaket vil bli tatt opp med en mobiltelefon for
å så overføres til passordbeskyttet bærbar PC. Og vil
bli slettet etter at opptakene er transkribert og
anonymisert.
NB! Mobile lagringsenheter bør ha mulighet for
kryptering.
Vil medarbeidere ha tilgang
til datamaterialet på lik linje
med daglig
ansvarlig/student?
Ja ○ Nei ●
Hvis ja, hvem?
Overføres
personopplysninger ved
hjelp av e-post/Internett?
Ja ○ Nei ● F.eks. ved bruk av elektronisk spørreskjema,
overføring av data til
samarbeidspartner/databehandler mm.
Hvis ja, hvilke?
Vil personopplysninger bli
utlevert til andre enn
prosjektgruppen?
Ja ○ Nei ●
Hvis ja, til hvem?
Samles opplysningene
inn/behandles av en
databehandler?
Ja ○ Nei ● Dersom det benyttes eksterne til helt eller delvis å
behandle personopplysninger, f.eks. Questback,
Synovate MMI, Norfakta eller
transkriberingsassistent eller tolk, er dette å betrakte
som en databehandler. Slike oppdrag må
kontraktsreguleres
Les mer om databehandleravtaler her
Hvis ja, hvilken?
12. Vurdering/godkjenning fra andre instanser
Søkes det om dispensasjon
fra taushetsplikten for å få
tilgang til data?
Ja ○ Nei ● For å få tilgang til taushetsbelagte opplysninger fra
f.eks. NAV, PPT, sykehus, må det søkes om
dispensasjon fra taushetsplikten. Dispensasjon
søkes vanligvis fra aktuelt departement.
Dispensasjon fra taushetsplikten for
helseopplysninger skal for alle typer forskning søkes
Regional komité for medisinsk og helsefaglig
forskningsetikk
Kommentar
Søkes det godkjenning fra
andre instanser?
Ja ○ Nei ● F.eks. søke registereier om tilgang til data, en
ledelse om tilgang til forskning i virksomhet, skole,
etc.Hvis ja, hvilke?
13. Prosjektperiode
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Prosjektperiode Prosjektstart:06.03.2013 Prosjektstart
Vennligst oppgi tidspunktet for når
førstegangskontakten med utvalget opprettes
og/eller datainnsamlingen starter.
Prosjektslutt
Vennligst oppgi tidspunktet for når datamaterialet
enten skal anonymiseres/slettes, eller arkiveres i
påvente av oppfølgingsstudier eller annet. Prosjektet
anses vanligvis som avsluttet når de oppgitte
analyser er ferdigstilt og resultatene publisert, eller
oppgave/avhandling er innlevert og sensurert.
Prosjektslutt:13.03.2013
Hva skal skje med
datamaterialet ved
prosjektslutt?
■ Datamaterialet anonymiseres
□ Datamaterialet oppbevares med
personidentifikasjon
Med anonymisering menes at datamaterialet
bearbeides slik at det ikke lenger er mulig å føre
opplysningene tilbake til enkeltpersoner.NB! Merk at
dette omfatter både oppgave/publikasjon og rådata.
Les mer om anonymisering
Hvordan skal datamaterialet
anonymiseres?
Transkiberingen av intervjuene vil anonymiseres når
de skrives, ved å bytte ut navnte navn og steder med
enkeltbokstaver. Sittatene benyttet i masteroppgaven
vil være korte og tatt ut av identifiserende kontekst.
Hovedregelen for videre oppbevaring av data med
personidentifikasjon er samtykke fra den registrerte.
Årsaker til oppbevaring kan være planlagte
oppfølgningsstudier, undervisningsformål eller
annet.
Datamaterialet kan oppbevares ved egen institusjon,
offentlig arkiv eller annet.
Les om arkivering hos NSD
Hvorfor skal datamaterialet
oppbevares med
personidentifikasjon?
Hvor skal datamaterialet
oppbevares, og hvor lenge?
14. Finansiering
Hvordan finansieres
prosjektet?
Dette gjøres av masterstudent.
15. Tilleggsopplysninger
Tilleggsopplysninger
16. Vedlegg
Antall vedlegg 1
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Appendix F
Reply from Data Protection
Official for Research
The reply from Data Protection Official for Research approved the descried
handling of the data from the user test.
The letter is on the following pages.
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